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HAPPY NO MORE: FEDERALISM DERAILED BY THE COURT
THAT WOULD BE KING OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
MICHAEL L. RUSTAD*
INTRODUCTION
Punitive damages debates are as routine in the United States as
Fourth of July fireworks displays. Both are part of our culture, and
both cause a lot of commotion. Arguably, between the two, the puni-
tive damages display is producing the most noise lately. Corporate
America, by employing state-of-the-art media savvy, has turned the cul-
tural debate into a cultural war. Juries are portrayed as insurgent radi-
cals encumbering corporate America with increasingly erratic and
unpredictable punitive damages awards.' The perception of punitive
damages is that of a greed-driven lottery permitting trial lawyers to get
rich by "urging juries to hammer deep pocket defendants 'to send a
message."" Punitive damages awards, critics maintain, are another
example of how the "profit motive [has] distort[ed] the pursuit of
justice in tort cases. ' Critics of punitive damages also refer to this
remedy as 'jackpot justice, a system in which anyone can seek punitive
damages for almost anything and wind up a multi-millionaire-and
perhaps billionaire."4
* Thomas F. Lambert, Jr. Professor of Law & Co-Director of the Intellectual Property
Law Concentration, Suffolk University Law School. This Article is dedicated to Judge
Guido Calabresi, who has appreciated and encouraged my scholarship on punitive dam-
ages from the start. This dedication in no way implies that he is responsible for any of my
viewpoints. My study of the multiple functions of punitive damages was inspired by Cala-
bresi's functionalist approach in The Costs of Accidents. I am grateful for the research assis-
tance and editorial suggestions of Edward J. Bander, Molly Donohue, Chryss J. Knowles,
Patty Nagle, Sandra Paulsson, and Karla Ota. I also wish to thank Diane D'Angelo, a refer-
ence librarian at Suffolk, who expertly tracked down eighteenth-century English exemplary
damages cases. Finally, I would like to thank Jonathan May, Ben Haley, and the staff of the
Maryland Law Review. This was a superb job of editing, especially given the historical mat-
ter discussed in the Article.
1. See, e.g., CATHERINE CRIER, THE CASE AGAINST LAWYERS 9-10, 196-98 (2002); PHILIP
K. HowARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: How AMERICA'S LAWSUIT CULTURE UN-
DERMINES OUR FREEDOM 21 (2001);JOHN STOSSEL, GIvE ME A BREA: How I EXPOSED HUCK-
STERS, CHEATS, AND SCAM ARTISTS AND BECAME THE SCOURGE OF THE LIBERAL MEDIA (2004).
2. The Lawsuit Lottery, LAS VEGAS REv.-J., May 21, 2002, available at http://www.
reviewjournal.com/lvrj-home/2002/May-21-Tue- 2 0 0 2 /opinion/18794145.html.
3. Ken McElroy, Tort Reform, The Medicine Our Legal System Needs, AM. FEDERALIST J.,
Jan. 5, 2003, at http://www.federalistjoumal.com/columns/kmcelroy/krn 2OO3OlO5.hun.
4. Warren Richey, Court Weighs Limits on "Jackpot"Jury Awards, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MON-
ITOR, Dec. 10, 2002, at 2; see also Marc Galanter, An Oil Strike in Hell: Contemporary Legends
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Toward the close of the twentieth century, lawyers for the busi-
ness community filed scores of amicus briefs in the U.S. Supreme
Court urging the imposition of new constitutional controls on the
states' mosaic of punitive damages regimes.5 Despite the unanimity of
social science research findings that there is no nationwide punitive
damages crisis,6 the majority of the Court agrees that concerted judi-
cial action is required to contain excessive punitive damages awards.7
The first determined and sweeping effort to reshape punitive
damages occurred when Justice O'Connor sounded the theme that
punitive damages were "skyrocketing" because juries were treating
corporations unfairly.8 In 1991, the Court applied the Substantive
Due Process Clause to a high-ratio punitive damages award for the
first time in history, and ultimately decided that a punitive damages
award against an insurer was "close to the line" of constitutional pro-
priety.9 In 1993, in a fractured opinion, the Court upheld the consti-
About the Civil Justice System, 40 ARIz. L. REV. 717, 726-33 (1998) (discussing punitive dam-
ages "atrocity stories").
5. E.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae Business Council of Alabama, BMW of N. Am. v. Gore,
517 U.S. 559 (1996) (No. 94-896); Brief of Amici Curiae American Tort Reform Associa-
tion et al., TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (No. 92-479). See
generally THEODORE B. OLSON & THEODORE J. BOUTROUS, WASH. LEGAL FOUND., THE CON-
STITUTIONALITY OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES (1989).
6. The empirical reality is that there is no nationwide crisis requiring radical judicial
tort reform. Despite the diversity in research methods and samples, research studies of the
law in action agree that there is no punitive damages crisis. See Michael L. Rustad, Unrav-
eling Punitive Damages: Current Data and Further Inquiry, 1998 Wis. L. REV. 15, 17-19; see also
Theodore Eisenberg, Damage Awards in Perspective: Behind the Headline-Grabbing Awards in
Exxon Valdez and Engle, 36 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1129, 1136-39 (2001) (summarizing a
study showing no increase in punitive damages awards between 1991 and 1996).
7. See, e.g., Gore, 517 U.S. 559. A number of U.S. Supreme Court Justices indicated
their willingness to consider a due process challenge to punitive damages prior to 1991.
See, e.g., Browning-Ferris Indus. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280 (1989) (Brennan,
J., concurring) ("I join the Court's opinion on the understanding that it leaves the door
open for a holding that the Due Process Clause constrains the imposition of punitive dam-
ages in civil cases brought by private parties."); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486
U.S. 71, 87 (1988) (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("In my view, because of the punitive char-
acter of such awards, there is reason to think that this may violate the Due Process
Clause.").
8. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. at 282 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); see also Pac. Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 42 (1991) (O'ConnorJ., dissent-
ing) ("Punitive damages are a powerful weapon. Imposed wisely and with restraint, they
have the potential to advance legitimate state interests. Imposed indiscriminately, how-
ever, they have a devastating potential for harm. Regrettably, common-law procedures for
awarding punitive damages fall into the latter category.").
9. Haslip, 499 U.S. at 23.
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tutionality of a large punitive damages award in a business torts case
where the potential harm to the oil industry was great."
Beginning in 1994, the Court has struck down a succession of
four large punitive awards against out-of-state corporations.1" Since
1989, the Court has issued seven opinions reshaping the constitu-
tional contours of punitive damages awarded against corporate de-
fendants. 12 The latest U.S. Supreme Court opinion reshaping the
path of punitive damages law was handed down in April of 2003 in
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell (Campbell I]). 3
The Court struck down a $145 million punitive damages award (ap-
proximately fifty-six times the compensatory damages awarded by the
jury) as disproportionate to the wrong committed by the insurer.14
The Court remanded the case to the Utah Supreme Court for review
of the award for excessiveness. 15 The Utah Supreme Court's interpre-
tation of the Court's remand order illustrates the difficulty of applying
a federal excessiveness review that collides with well-established state
procedures for reviewing punitive damages.16 The Utah Supreme
Court acknowledged that its "duty in the face of a remand order de-
mand [ed] unwavering fidelity to the letter and spirit of the mandate,"
but noted that by assigning it this duty, the Supreme Court had vested
it with "discretion to exercise . . . independent judgment" in valuing
an appropriate award.1 7 Despite the existence of well-established stan-
10. TXO, 509 U.S. at 460-61 (plurality). Again, in TXO, Justice O'Connor's dissent,
joined by justice White in full and Justice Souter in part, reiterated a concern over mon-
strous awards that were assessed against out-of-state corporations and were unfairly "trans-
ferring money from 'wealthy' corporations to comparatively needier plaintiffs." Id. at 491
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
11. Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994) (vacating a multimillion dollar
punitive damages award against a Japanese manufacturer on the grounds that Oregon did
not provide for a mandated postverdict review of the award for excessiveness); Gore, 517
U.S. 559 (reversing a multimillion dollar award against the U.S. subsidiary of a German
automobile company on grounds that the award was so excessive as to violate substantive
due process); Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424 (2001)
(vacating a large punitive damages award in a trade dress case because the federal appel-
late court applied the wrong standard of review); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Camp-
bell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) [hereinafter Campbell I1] (reversing an award of $145 million in
punitive damages, where full compensatory damages only amounted to $1 million, because
such an excessive award would violate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
12. Browning-Ferris, 492 U.S. 257; Haslip, 499 U.S. 1; TXO, 509 U.S. 443; Oberg, 512 U.S.
415; Gore, 517 U.S. 559; Cooper, 532 U.S. 424; Campbell II, 538 U.S. 408.
13. 538 U.S. 408.
14. Id. at 415, 426, 429. The jury originally awarded $2.6 million in compensatory dam-
ages. Id. at 415.
15. Id. at 429.
16. See Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 98 P.3d 409 (Utah 2004).
17. Id. at 411-12.
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dards in Utah state law for reviewing punitive damages awards, the
Utah Supreme Court felt that it was bound to disregard these stan-
dards, and to "follow the lead of the Supreme Court and restrict [its]
review to the Gore guideposts. 1 8 Utah state law differs from the Su-
preme Court's excessiveness framework in its use of the wealth of the
defendant in calibrating the amount of damages.1 9 The conflict be-
tween the Court's due process guideposts and state law thus illustrates
the confusion created by the Court's constitutionalization of punitive
damages.
This Article is inspired by Guido Calabresi's pioneering theory
that the law of torts performs multiple functions.2 ° For more than two
hundred years, the Court deferred to the states' choice of substantive,
procedural, and evidentiary rules for tort remedies.21 Calabresi has
argued more recently that the federal courts' incursion into the torts
process has been marked by a one-dimensional and simplistic view of
tort rights and remedies.22 In this Article, I focus upon the ways that
the United States Supreme Court is forcing the states into a common
mold based upon an individualistic retributory jurisprudence bypas-
sing the multiple functions of punitive damages that have evolved over
two centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
I call the Court's microanalysis of punitive damages judicial
miniaturism2" because of its myopic focus on one-on-one torts. The
Court's judicial miniaturism is reminiscent of Plato's Allegory of the
Cave,24 because the Court is serving as a punitive damages puppeteer
who interferes with the ability of the states to constrain corporate
wrongdoing.25 Plato's antidemocratic work, The Republic, conceives of
18. Id. at 414. This was the case even though the Utah Supreme Court had, after Camp-
bell II, modified these standards "as necessary to fully meet the federal requirements" ar-
ticulated in Campbell II and earlier cases. Id
19. Id at 414 n.3 (citing Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 808 (Utah 1991)).
20. See GuIDO CALBREsi, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(1970) [hereinafter THE COSTS OF AcCIDENTS].
21. See BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 598 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting)(noting that state trial procedure that leaves the decision of the amount of punitive dam-
ages "to the discretion of the jury, subject to some judicial review for 'reasonableness,'
furnishes a defendant with all the process that is 'due'").
22. See Guido Calabresi, The Complexity of Torts-The Case of Punitive Damages 4 &
n.1 (Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter Complexity] (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author).
23. My discussion of judicial miniaturism is inspired by the sociologist John F. Stolte's
work. See John F. Stolte et al., Sociological Miniaturism: Seeing the Big Through the Small in
Social Psychology, 27 ANN. REV. Soc. 387 (2001).
24. 2 PLATO, THE REPUBuC, book VII (Paul Shorey trans., William Heinemann Ltd. &
Harvard Univ. Press 1970).
25. According to Professor Marc Cohen:
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philosopher-king overseers who apprehend truth and justice through
a study of forms. 26 The states' different approaches to punitive dam-
ages, in contrast, represent democracy at work to the extent the rem-
edy is responsive to social problems on the local level.2 v Quoting
former Chief Justice Burger, Chief Justice Rehnquist observed that
"[t]he essence of federalism is that states must be free to develop a
variety of solutions to problems and not be forced into a common,
uniform mold."28 Moreover, the Court has recognized that "[i]n our
federal system, States necessarily have considerable flexibility in deter-
mining the level of punitive damages that they will allow in different
classes of cases and in any particular case."
29
The Rehnquist Court has shown its unhappiness with the federal
preemption of state law in nearly every substantive field of law save
punitive damages.3 0 The Court's punitive damages jurisprudence
constitutes a radical departure from what Justice Brandeis described
as "one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single cou-
In the allegory, Plato likens people untutored in the Theory of Forms to prisoners
chained in a cave, unable to turn their heads. All they can see is the wall of the
cave. Behind them burns a fire. Between the fire and the prisoners there is a
parapet, along which puppeteers can walk. The puppeteers, who are behind the
prisoners, hold up puppets that cast shadows on the wall of the cave. The prison-
ers are unable to see these puppets, the real objects, that pass behind them. What
the prisoners see and hear are shadows and echoes cast by objects that they do
not see.
S. Marc Cohen, The Allegory of the Cave, Lecture Notes from the History of Ancient Phi-
losophy Course at the University of Washington, at http://faculty.washington.edu/
smcohen/320/cave.htm (last updated July 8, 2002).
26. See PLATO, supra note 24, book VI, at 5 ("Whichever [of the philosophers and
nonphilosophers] appear competent to guard the laws and pursuits of society, these we
should establish as guardians.").
27. See BetsyJ. Grey, The New FederalismJurisprudence and National Tort Reform, 59 WAsH.
& LEE L. REV. 475, 511-12, 517-18 (2002) (arguing that state legislative tort reforms are
more democratic than nationalized reforms).
28. Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 375 (1986) (quoting Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S.
418, 431 (1979)).
29. BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996).
30. The Rehnquist Court has struck down numerous federal statutes on the grounds
that they intruded upon the province of state law. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v.
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding that Congress had not identified a history and pat-
tern of unconstitutional employment discrimination by the State of Alabama sufficient to
abrogate Alabama's Eleventh Amendment immunity); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S.
598 (2000) (holding that Congress lacked the constitutional authority to enact the Vio-
lence Against Women Act, and thus regulate crime on a local level, because the crime did
not involve economic activity or interstate commerce); College Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid
Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 (1999) (holding that the State of Florida
was not subject to a trademark infringement case because the Patent Remedy Act was not a
valid exercise of Congress's power to abrogate state sovereign immunity).
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rageous State may... serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and
economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country."31
The Court's federalization or centralization of punitive damages
undermines the role of states as laboratories of punitive damages re-
form. The philosopher-king 2 was all-knowing and enlightened be-
cause he was not in the darkness of the Cave where ordinary mortals
lived.33 The Court is likely to continue diverting the path of punitive
damages as new procedural, evidentiary, and substantive challenges
are on the horizon. 34 The Supreme Court's new institutional role as
"Punitive Damages Guardian" is yet another example of what Cala-
bresi would regard as "aggressive, willful, statist behavior... the very
opposite of what a judicious moderate, or even conservative, judicial
body should do."3 5  Calabresi's The Costs of Accidents should be
mandatory reading for the Justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, who
seem intent on forcing the multiple functions of punitive damages
into an individual retributory mold.
31. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis,J., dissenting).
32. For a discussion of Plato's concept of the philosopher-king, see Frederick Nymeyer,
Progressive Calvinism: On the Peerless Mosaic Law (and the Foolishness of Greek Philosophers), PRO-
GRESSIVE CALVINISM, March 1956, available at http://www.freerepublic.com/forum/
a3a4184Ob212f.htm.
33. See PLATO, supra note 24, book VI, at 3-5 ("Since the philosophers are those who are
capable of apprehending that which is eternal and unchanging, while those who are inca-
pable of this, but lose themselves and wonder amid the multiplicities of multifarious
things, are not philosophers, which of the two kinds ought to be the leaders in a state?").
34. New constitutional challenges to punitive damages are likely given the multiplicity
of state punitive damages procedures and substantive standards. One likely candidate for
challenge is the use of corporate wealth in setting the amount of damages in the punitive
damages equation. States vary widely in the admissibility of the financial status of the de-
fendant in punitive damages litigation. Maryland and Montana, for example, do not per-
mit evidence of the defendant's financial means until a finding of punitive liability has
been made. MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (2002); MONT. CODE ANN.
§ 27-1-221(7)(a) (2003). Nevada allows evidence of the financial condition of the defen-
dant to be admitted during the second phase of a bifurcated proceeding, which is man-
dated in cases where punitive damages are at issue. NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(3)-(4)
(Michie 1996). For a discussion of various states' positions, see James McLoughlin, Anno-
tation, Necessity of Determination or Showing of Liability for Punitive Damages Before Discovery or
Reception of Evidence of Defendant's Wealth, 32 A.L.R. 4th 432 (1984 & Supp. 2004). Another
likely corporate challenge is to multiple punitive damages awards in products liability
cases. The overkill problem was first identified by Judge Friendly in Roginsky v. Richardson-
Merrell Inc., 378 F.2d 832, 840 (2d Cir. 1967). Judge Friendly observed that "multiple puni-
tive awards running into the hundreds" could result in overkill when assessed against a
drug manufacturer already subject to "vigorous" FDA regulation and enforcement. Id.
35. Guido Calabresi, What Clarence Thomas Knows, N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1991. Even Wil-
liam Suter, the Clerk of the U.S. Supreme Court, acknowledges the Court's recent deci-
sions limiting punitive damages as an example of judicial activism. Jonathan Ringel, Bar
Inductees Get Candid Glimpse of Supreme Court, THE RECORDER, Sept. 17, 2003.
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Part I of this Article briefly reviews the path of punitive damages
law through three stages of development from government oppres-
sion to personal torts to sanctions for corporate wrongdoing. Punitive
damages as we know the doctrine today originated in eighteenth-cen-
tury England during the reign of King George III, and was exported
to America soon after. 6 Corporate punitive liability proved, in retro-
spect, to be the most important development as the remedy evolved
from punishing individual torts to the social control of corporate
wrongdoing.
Part II examines the untold history of how corporate America led
the movement to constitutionalize punitive damages, and culminates
with a discussion of the Court's unmaking of this valuable state rem-
edy. When and where did the theory arise that the U.S. Supreme
Court could regulate punitive damages better than the states? There
is an obvious but often undiscussed connection between the Court's
constitutionalization of punitive damages and the tort reform agenda
of corporate America. Part III examines the ways that the Court's pu-
nitive damages jurisprudence is interfering with the sociolegal func-
tions the remedy plays in the states. Part III argues that the Court's
judicial miniaturism conflicts with the diverse manifest and latent
functions fulfilled by punitive damages in the states."y The Court's
emphasis on individuated retributive punishment38 deflects attention
from the broader social functions fulfilled by the remedy of punitive
damages. 9 Finally, I conclude that the Court should take the next
36. David G. Owen, A Punitive Damages Overview: Functions, Problems and Reform, 39 VILL.
L. REV. 363, 368-69 (1994) [hereinafter Overview].
37. Professor David Owen notes how courts generally refer to punishment and deter-
rence as the only purposes of punitive damages, which "masks the variety of specific func-
tions that punitive damages actually serve." Id. at 373.
38. As the Court stated in Campbell II, "punitive damages . .. are aimed at deterrence
and retribution." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 416 (2003)
(citing Cooper Indus. Inc. v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 432 (2001)); see
also BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins., Co., v.
Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
39. There is a school of sociology that deliberately examines the world from a
microperspective of the daily details of an individual's life, but the defect of this approach
is the tendency to overlook large-scale social forces. Microsociology is the study of the
social relationships seen at the individual level focusing upon the self and social interac-
tion generally in face-to-face contact. Department of Sociology, University of Leicester,
Microsociology Module Description, at http://www.le.ac.uk/sociology/ug/modules/
syl011.html (last updated June 7, 2004). In contrast, macrosociology focuses upon the
larger social functions such as "the discovery of structure within the society as a whole, the
examination of large scale relationships in society, of the relationships among the struc-
tures within the society. Structures set the tone for behavior, the context within which
behavior takes place." Richard H. Anderson, Department of Sociology, University of Colo-
rado at Denver, Theory and Research: Approaches in Sociology, at http://car-
2005]
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exit off the substantive due process highway and leave tort reform to
the states. The Court should return punitive damages to the fifty ex-
perimental laboratories of the states so that this vital remedy can fulfill
the broad societal functions of tort law first identified by Judge
Calabresi.
I. THE PATH OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES FOR THE COMMON GOOD
The Rehnquist Court, cheered on by corporate America, has
launched an "economic liberties" revolution, forcing the states into a
common mold to solve a purported punitive damages crisis. For more
than two hundred years, the Court deferred to the states' choice of
substantive, procedural, and evidentiary rules for assessing and award-
ing punitive damages. It is a core principle of federalism that the
states be given wide discretion to experiment in an area where there is
no national consensus. 40 After centuries of common-law develop-
ment, the Court has discovered that substantive due process requires
it to assume the role of punitive damages overseer. 41 The Court has,
in effect, federalized a tort remedy that had been the exclusive prov-
ince of state law. This Part of the Article confirms that the Court has
strayed far from core principles of federalism by its punitive damages
jurisprudence.42
I begin by examining how punitive damages fulfill multiple func-
tions because of the need to adapt to the throes of social or techno-
logical change. This brief historical sketch confirms that punitive
damages are a legal institution that has been responsive to emergent
social problems.43 The history of punitive damages is divided into
three periods: (1) The English Exemplary Damages Era (1763-1793);
(2) The Personal Torts Era (1793-1870); and (3) The Corporate Pun-
bon.cudenver.edu/public/sociology/introsoc/topics/UnitNotes/weekO2.html (last
revisedJan. 13, 2000).
40. Cf Gore, 517 U.S. at 614-19 (appendix to opinion of Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (sur-
veying sixteen states that capped the size of punitive damages, another thirteen states re-
quiring awards to be split with the state, and twelve states mandating bifurcation of the
punitive and compensatory phases of the trial).
41. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text.
42. In Gore, Justice Scalia argued that "[t]he Court has constructed a framework that
does not genuinely constrain, that does not inform state legislatures and lower courts-
that does nothing at all except confer an artificial air of doctrinal analysis upon its essen-
tially ad hoc determination that this particular award of punitive damages was not 'fair.'"
517 U.S. at 606 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
43. That is, punitive damages are a part of society's structure, and they serve important
societal functions. See InformationBlast, Functionalism (Sociology) ("Structural-function-
alism takes the view that society consists of parts (e.g., police, hospitals, schools, and
farms), each of which has its own function.") at http://www.informationblast.com/Func-
tionalism_(sociology).html (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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ishment Era (1870 to Present). During each era, the signature of pu-
nitive damages has been punishment and deterrence of conduct
inimical to the public interest. In the first two periods, punitive dam-
ages punished oppressive personal torts. In the more recent corpo-
rate punishment era, punitive damages expanded further to punish
impersonal wrongdoing committed by artificial persons.4' The puni-
tive damages backlash is a part of a larger campaign to downsize the
civil justice system into a semi-comatose state.
A. English Exemplary Damages (1763-1793)
Punitive damages were prefigured in the remedy of exemplary
damages in eighteenth-century England.45 Courts used words like
"fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression" to describe the predi-
cate for exemplary damages.46 The remedy of exemplary damages
was also decoupled from the amount of compensatory damages be-
cause it disregarded the principle of compensation and "the amount
of relief [was] left to the discretion of the jury."47
The English doctrine of exemplary damages originated as a
means to punish the abuse of governmental power in the 1763 com-
panion cases Wilkes v. Wood48 and Huckle v. Money,49 which arose out of
the government's prosecution of the publishers and printers of The
North Briton, a newspaper that had been critical of the government. In
Wilkes, John Wilkes, the publisher of The North Briton and a member of
Parliament, sued the Secretary of State for trespass, after the Secretary
44. The debate over the constitutionality of punitive damages exclusively focuses upon
the due process rights of institutional defendants rather than professional or individual
defendants. David Owen divided punitive damages defendants into three categories, each
possibly requiring different treatment: "(1) individual defendants; (2) professional defend-
ants; and (3) institutional defendants." David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and the Public
Good, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 103, 105 (1982). These classes of punitive damages defendants
vary in the power they wield, as well as in society's expectations about how that power
should be used. Id. This Article focuses upon corporate punitive liability rather than indi-
vidual or professional defendants. The bulk of the law of punitive damages when it comes
to individual or professional defendants remains fixed and enduring. In contrast, the law
of punitive damages against corporate or institutional defendants is in the throes of
change.
45. See Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages
Awards: Reforming the Tort Reformers, 42 AM. U. L. REv. 1269, 1287 (1993) [hereinafter Histor-
ical Continuity].
46. THEODORE SEDGW1CK, A TREATISE ON THE MEASURE OF DAMAGES, OR AN INQUIRY
INTO THE PRINCIPLES WHICH GOVERN THE AMOUNT OF COMPENSATION RECOVERED IN SUITS
AT LAw 38 (Arno Press 1972) (1847).
47. Id. at 488.
48. 98 Eng. Rep. 489 (K.B. 1763).
49. 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
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issued a general warrant for the search of Wilkes's house.5 ° Huckle
involved a lower-level employee of the paper who was arrested and
detained under the general warrant.5' Lord Justice Camden coined
the term "exemplary damages" to describe a large award where the
actual damage was slight.52 His choice of the word "exemplary" re-
flects the role the remedy played in moderating abuses of power. He
noted that the jury was well within its discretion in expressing social
disapproval to government agents who were heedless to civil liberties:
To enter a man's house by virtue of a nameless warrant, in
order to procure evidence, is worse than the Spanish Inquisi-
tion; a law under which no Englishman would wish to live an
hour; it was a most daring public attack made upon the lib-
erty of the subject.5"
The sting of the shilling5 4 was thus levied against the King's agents for
their wrongful conduct. The availability of exemplary damages in
cases such as Wilkes and Huckle played a significant role in establishing
the salutary principle that no one, no matter how powerful, was above
the law. English courts have since upheld punitive damages against
other "oppressive, arbitrary or unconstitutional action by the servants
of the government.""' The first exemplary damages awards were part
of a larger story of the rule of law. While the remedy originated to
50. 98 Eng. Rep. at 490.
51. 95 Eng. Rep. at 768.
52. In Huckle, Lord Camden described the severity of the government's wrongdoing
and concluded that exemplary damages were appropriate:
[T]hey saw a magistrate over all the King's subjects, exercising arbitrary power,
violating Magna Charta, and attempting to destroy the liberty of the kingdom, by
insisting upon the legality of this general warrant before them; they heard the
King's Counsel, and saw the solicitor of the Treasury endeavoring to support and
maintain the legality of the warrant in a tyrannical and severe manner. These are
the ideas which struck the jury on the trial; and I think they have done right in
giving exemplary damages.
Id. at 769.
53. Id.
54. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., The Case for Punitive Damages (Including Their Coverage by
Liability Insurance), 35 Am. TRIAL LAw. Ass'N 164, 164 (1974) (noting that the historical
justification for punitive damages was for the "chastising shilling").
55. Rookes v. Barnard, 1 All E.R. 367, 410 (H.L. 1964). For example, exemplary dam-
ages were awarded against the government for the brutal flogging of an innocent soldier in
Benson v. Frederick, 97 Eng. Rep. 1130 (K.B. 1766). In Benson, the soldier received a £150
judgment against his colonel, who ordered the flogging to vex a fellow officer. Id. Lord
Mansfield held that though the damages "were very great, and beyond the proportion of
what the man had suffered," the defendant's motion for a new trial should be denied
because the injury was inflicted out of pure spite by a fellow soldier. Id. Thus, the exem-
plary damages principle served the function of restraining the arbitrary and unfair abuse of
executive power.
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punish misdeeds by government officials, it soon evolved to punish
wealthy elites who abused their position of power by breaching mo-
res56 of the local community. From the beginning, a defendant's fi-
nancial condition or ability to pay an exemplary damages award was
always a factor to be taken into account by the factfinder.57
As the court explained in Merest v. Harvey,58 English exemplary
damages also fulfilled the function of keeping the community peace
by preventing the practice of dueling to settle disputes.59 In Merest, an
exemplary damages award of £500 was upheld against a contemptuous
aristocrat who trespassed on the plaintiff's land and fired at his birds
while using intemperate and insulting language.6" The court rea-
soned that it was well within the bounds of its discretion to uphold the
award given the nature of the defendant's conduct. One justice noted
that a court reviewing a £500 exemplary damages award in another
case upheld the award where the defendant committed the rude act
"of merely knocking a man's hat off."61
More generally, the exemplary damages remedy served to protect
the social order by punishing conduct breaching normative bounda-
ries of acceptable behavior considered critical to a community's sur-
vival. The misuse of official power was the gist of the exemplary
damages assessed in Forde v. Skinner,62 where the manager of an or-
phanage ordered that a young girl's head be shaved in an unjustified,
56. The sociological concept of "mores" refers to norms that reflect the fundamental
values of the group, versus mere "folkways," which are customary ways of doing things in a
culture but not critically important to the culture's survival. These terms were coined in
WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF US-
AGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES, AND MORALS (1906). Professor Sumner notes that:
[F]olkways are the right ways to satisfy all interests, because they are traditional,
and exist in fact. [Folkways] extend over the whole of life. There is a right way to
catch game, to win a wife, to make one's self appear, to cure disease, to honor
ghosts, to treat comrades or strangers, to behave when a child is born, on the
warpath, in council, and so on in all cases which can arise.
Id. at 28. The mores constitute the social code. Mores include
the notion of what ought to be done, for all should cooperate to bring to pass, in
the order of life, what ought to be. All notions of propriety, decency, chastity,
politeness, order, duty, right, rights, discipline, respect, reverence, cooperation,
and fellowship, especially all things in regard to which good and ill depend en-
tirely on the point at which the line is drawn, are in the mores.
Id at 231.
57. See Rookes, 1 All E.R. at 411 ("[T]he means of the parties, irrelevant in the assess-
ment of compensation, are material in the assessment of exemplary damages.").
58. 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (C.P. 1814).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. 172 Eng. Rep. 687 (Horsham Assizes 1830).
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spiteful act.63 In Sears v. Lyons,6 4 a defendant laid poisoned barley on
his neighbor's premises for the sole purpose of destroying his poul-
try.65 As Thomas Lambert emphasizes, the imposition of exemplary
damages in such cases also helped to preserve community social order
"by permitting the insulted plaintiff to take his revenge in the court-
room rather than in the alley."6 6
An example of the role that exemplary damages played in the
preservation of social order can be found in the imposition of exem-
plary damages to punish aggravated torts threatening the family, the
social institution so central to pre-industrial society. This is evidenced
by the frequent imposition of exemplary damages in seduction cases.
In Tullidge v. Wade,6 7 exemplary damages were awarded to a family for
the insult of the seduction of their daughter.68 In Elliot v. Nicklin,6 9
exemplary damages were imposed in an action for seduction of a
young woman, when the defendant was masquerading as an honora-
ble suitor.
7 0
The adjectives and phrases used by English courts to describe the
type of conduct that merits an assessment of exemplary damages in-
clude "malicious, vindictive, high handed, wanton, willful, arrogant,
cynical, oppressive, and contumelious disregard of the plaintiffs'
rights. '7' Thus, English exemplary damages serve as fines designed
"to hit the defendant hard if he has disregarded the rights of others
and show that that sort of conduct does not pay. "72
B. American Punitive Damages for Personal Torts (1793-1870)
The U.S. Supreme Court, in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatherman
Tool Group, Inc., sketched a history of punitive damages in its holding
that federal appellate courts must apply a de novo standard when con-
ducting excessiveness reviews of punitive damages, rather than the
more deferential standard of abuse of discretion used in reviewing
compensatory damages.7" In its decision, the Court argued that puni-
63. Id.
64. 171 Eng. Rep. 658 (KtB. 1818).
65. Id.
66. Lambert, supra note 54, at 168.
67. 95 Eng. Rep. 909 (K.B. 1769).
68. Id.
69. 146 Eng. Rep. 719 (Ex. D. 1818).
70. Id.
71. British Midland Tool Ltd. v. Midland Int'l Tooling, 2 B.C.L.C. 523, 601 (Ch. 2003)
(citation omitted).
72. Loudon v. Ryder, 2 Q.B. 202, 209 (1953).
73. 532 U.S. 424, 437-38 n.ll (2001).
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tive damages in the nineteenth century performed a compensatory
role and served as the functional equivalent of today's remedies for
"contemporary categories of personal injury, such as emotional dis-
tress, loss of enjoyment of life, and the like."74
To this day, Michigan's exemplary damages fulfill a purely com-
pensatory role. 75 Scripps v. Reilly, 76 for example, involved a libelous
newspaper story about the plaintiff, entitled "How a Sneak Made
Love. 7  The Scripps court described the extracompensatory role of
exemplary damages in that state:
Where the act done is one which from its very nature must
be expected to result in mischief, or where there is malice, or
willful or wanton misconduct, carelessness or negligence so
great as to indicate a reckless disregard of the rights or safety
of others, a new element of damage is allowed, viz.: for injury
to the feelings of the plaintiff.
78
Reflecting the Scripps reasoning, the Court in Cooper used its historical
account of punitive damages history to construct its schizoid standards
of review for compensatory and punitive damages. 79 However, the un-
derlying evidence for that historical account does not in fact support
the Court's conclusion that early punitive damages served the singular
purpose of compensating intangible injuries.8s Anthony Sebok's sub-
stantive review of early American cases confirms that punitive damages
were never single-minded:
The cases can be placed into six categories: (1) compensa-
tion for emotional suffering; (2) compensation for insult; (3)
personal vindication; (4) vindication of the state; (5) punish-
ment to set an example; and (6) punishment to deter. While
these categories overlap to some extent, and the decisions
74. AnthonyJ. Sebok, What Did Punitive Damages Do? Why Misunderstanding the History of
Punitive Damages Matters Today, 78 CHI.-KENr L. REv. 163, 180 (2003) (discussing Cooper, 532
U.S. at 437-38 n.11).
75. E.g., Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, Inc., 364 N.W.2d 600, 604-05 (Mich. 1984) (hold-
ing that punitive and exemplary damages are compensatory in nature under the state's
libel laws); Jackovich v. Gen. Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 326 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1982) (differentiating between punitive and exemplary damages and holding that
while the former are not allowed under Michigan law, the latter are available "to compen-
sate plaintiffs for humiliation, sense of outrage and indignity").
76. 38 Mich. 10 (1878).
77. Id. at 20.
78. Id. at 23.
79. See Sebok, supra note 74, at 179-81.
80. Id. at 180-81.
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often suggest that more than one rationale is being adopted,
the differences between the categories are worth noting.8 1
Moreover, Professor Sebok's analysis of the key cases cited in a
leading torts treatise of the early twentieth century casts doubt on the
Court's argument that punitive damages were chiefly a precursor to
the modern tort of the intentional infliction of emotional distress.8 2
The Sections that follow examine a larger subset of early punitive
damages cases that confirm that punitive damages fulfilled multiple
social functions, rather than the single function of compensating in-
tangible injuries.
1. Remedies for Conduct Violative of Local Norms.-The first Ameri-
can exemplary damages award grew out of an aggravated breach of
promise to marry case. 3 In that case the court reasoned that exem-
plary damages were properly imposed for misconduct "of the most
atrocious and dishonourable nature. " 4 Other early decisions im-
posed punitive damages awards not just to punish the defendant but
to protect "society against a violation of personal rights and social or-
der."85 For example, a New Jersey court upheld an exemplary dam-
ages award in Stout v. Prall,86 a case where the defendant debauched
the plaintiffs daughter.87 The court observed that the remedy was
designed to "recompense the plaintiff for the cruel and severe injury
of disturbing the peace of his family, and destroying his parental pros-
pects."88  The court upheld a £100 award on grounds that the
defendant
disgraced a family, ruined the hopes of a father, and injured
a girl of reputation. If he suffers, he will suffer justly, and to
his own wickedness will he be indebted for it. [The court]
said it was time to put a stop to these monstrous violations of
morality and honour, and... wished it to be known, that the
peace of families was not to be invaded, or innocence be-
trayed with impunity. In this case [the court] thought the
youth of the girl, (not being above 17) and her good reputa-
tion, aggravated the conduct of the defendant.89
81. Id. at 197.
82. See id. at 190-92 (discussing cases cited in 1 THOMAS ATKINS STREET, THE FOUNDA-
TIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY 484-87 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1980) (1906)).
83. Coryell v. Colbaugh, 1 N.J.L. 77 (1791).
84. Id. at 77.
85. Voltz v. Blackmar, 64 N.Y. 440, 444 (1876).
86. 1 N.J.L. 79 (1791).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 80.
89. Id.
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In cases such as these, exemplary damages exacted punishment
against those social deviants who violated social norms, but not neces-
sarily the criminal law,9" and served as a remedy designed to keep the
community peace as an alternative to dueling or self-help.91 Punitive
damages were first formulated to redress personal torts that violated
the collective conscience9 2 of the local community. In addressing "of-
fences against morals to which the law has annexed no penalty as pub-
lic wrongs,"9 3 punitive damages were not just levied to punish the
harm done to a single plaintiff, but to the entire society.9 4 Thus, puni-
tive damages even became an "instrument of public correction."95
For example, in Voltz v. Blackmar, the court acknowledged the use of
punitive damages, in addition to acting as compensation, to be "a pun-
ishment to the defendant, and . . .a protection to society against a
violation of personal rights and social order."96
During the pre-Civil War period, punitive damages could be as-
sessed to protect the slave trade and to guarantee the chattel status of
slaves fleeing to free states. In Oliver v. Kaufman,97 the estate of a slave
owner sued the defendants for tortiously harboring twelve slaves and
90. Cf McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375, 376 (Pa. 1836) (holding that exemplary
damages may be appropriate to punish wrongdoers in cases involving "offenses against
morals to which the law has annexed no penalty as public wrongs").
91. Clarence Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1198 (1931).
According to Morris, punitive damages can be regarded as the functional equivalent of an
"orderly, legal retaliation ... to be preferred to a private vengeance, which will disturb the
peace of the community." Id.
92. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DrISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 70-110 (George Simpson
trans., The Free Press 1947) (1893) (describing the function of crime and punishment as
promoting a sense of social solidarity).
93. McBride, 5 Watts at 376.
94. Today's U.S. Supreme Court is in the process of individuating punitive damages by
seeking to recalibrate the amount of awards to the amount necessary to punish the harm
done to a single tort victim, instead of basing them on the harm that was levied on the local
community or larger society. This microanalysis of punishment is an approach favored by
some academic commentators. E.g., Thomas B. Colby, Beyond the Multiple Punishment Prob-
lem: Punitive Damages as Punishment for Individual, Private Wrongs, 87 MINN. L. REv. 583, 587
(2003). Colby concludes that the
practice of punishing the defendant, in a single case brought by a single victim,
for the full scope of societal harm caused by its entire course of wrongful con-
duct-which I will refer to as awarding "total harm" punitive damages-has led
countless judges and commentators to worry about the potential for excessive
multiple punishment: the possibility that several victims will obtain punitive dam-
ages awards that were each designed to punish the entire wrongful scheme, re-
sulting in unjustly high cumulative punishment.
Id.
95. McBride, 5 Watts at 376.
96. 64 N.Y. 440, 444 (1876).
97. 18 F. Cas. 657 (E.D. Pa. 1850) (No. 10,497).
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helping them escape in Cumberland County, Pennsylvania.98 The
court observed that in harboring cases, a master could not only re-
cover the full value of the slave rescued by abolitionists, but also exem-
plary or punitive damages.99
In an Arkansas case, a slave owner brought a trespass action
against another for whipping a number of the slave owner's slaves.100
The plaintiff alleged that the whipping left the slaves unable to work
for a certain time. 01 The court cited an Alabama decision that per-
mitted a jury to "measure the damages, not merely by the value of the
slave, but to give smart money" where appropriate. 10 2 These cases
demonstrate that conduct punishable by exemplary damages reflected
the social norms of the local community, which defined slaves as per-
sonal property.
2. Moderating Abuses of Power by Individuals.-In early punitive
damages cases, there was no fixed standard for measuring damages
because each case rested on its own facts. Vindictive damages were
awarded where there were "peculiar circumstances of aggravation; as
in the case of extreme cruelty, provocation or insult, wantonness or
malice."1 In the early history of punitive damages, courts gave the
jury vast discretion in setting the amount of the award. 0 4 Punitive
damages were calibrated to the enormity of defendant's offense, not
the level of the plaintiff's damages. A North Carolina court stated, for
example, that punitive "damages should be in proportion to the de-
gree of malice," not to the compensatory damages awarded to the
plaintiff.10
5
Evidence of a defendant's wealth was broadly admissible in libel
cases because, on one hand, a defendant's wealth, social rank, and
98. 1I at 659.
99. As the court noted:
In case of a rescue of a captured fugitive, or of an illegal interference to hinder
such recapture, when the master had it in his power to effect it, the defendant
would be liable, not only to the penalty, but also to pay the full value of the slave
thus rescued, and even punitive or exemplary damages, as in other actions for a
tort. But where the offense alleged is harboring or concealing, the plaintiff, if he
would recover more than nominal damages, must show that the slave was lost to
him in consequences of such illegal harboring or concealing.
Id. at 661-62.
100. Henry v. Armstrong, 15 Ark. 162, 163 (1854).
101. Id.
102. Id. at 167 (citing Wheat v. Croom, 7 Ala. 349 (1845)).
103. Merrills v. Tariff Mfg. Co., 10 Conn. 384, 386 (1835).
104. See, e.g., Pullman Palace-Car Co. v. Lawrence, 22 So. 53, 60 (Miss. 1897).
105. Gilreath v. Allen, 32 N.C. 58, 60 (1849).
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influence were relevant to the issue of the extent of injury.1"6 A
libelous statement from a wealthy or powerful defendant caused more
damage in the community than a servant's scurrilous slur. While evi-
dence of wealth was generally inadmissible in most civil actions, it was
always material evidence in punitive damages cases where it was admis-
sible to calibrate the amount of punitive damages or "to graduate the
punishment."" 7 On the other hand, larger damage awards for the
wealthy also related directly to goals of punishment; the wealthier the
defendant, the larger the punitive damages award:
[A] verdict of a few dollars, which would operate as a punish-
ment, if assessed against a poor man, would utterly fail to
have that effect upon a man of wealth. Verdicts for punitive
damages ought, therefore, to be graduated according to the
ability of the' offender to pay. Nothing else would be just or
reasonable. It is also clear that a man of high standing and
of great intelligence, as well as wealth, ought to be punished
for the same offense in a degree different from the poor and
obscure. This is certainly true in view of the fact that such
verdicts for damages are intended to be held up as examples
to restrain the repetition of offenses.10 8
In contrast, if a plaintiff "offers no evidence of the defendant's
wealth with a view of enhancing [punitive damages], he in effect says,
'I ask no damages against the defendant except as a mere individual,
without any regard to his property or estate."' 109 In an 1825 slander
case, the Connecticut Supreme Court admitted evidence offered by
the plaintiff that the defendant "was a man of property, being worth
from 10,000 to 15,000 dollars."110 The plaintiffs counsel argued that
the amount of exemplary damages, which "would be sufficient to si-
lence a poor man's slanders, would have no effect but to excite and
envenom those of a rich man." 11 The court agreed, observing:
Great wealth is generally attended with correspondent influ-
ence; and little influence is the usual concomitant of little
property. The declarations of a man of fortune concerning
the character of another, like a weapon thrown by a vigorous
hand, will not fail to inflict a deeper wound than the same
106. Barkly v. Copeland, 15 P. 307, 310 (Cal. 1887).
107. id,
108. Guengerech v. Smith, 34 Iowa 348, 349-50 (1872) (Beck, C.J., dissenting).
109. See Mullin v. Spangenberg, 112 Ill. 140, 145 (1884) (upholding a $5,000 award
against a policeman who choked a grocer who had objected to the brutal treatment of a
prisoner).
110. Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24, 25 (1825).
111. Id. at 26.
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declarations made by a man of small estate, and, as a conse-
quence not uncommon, of small influence. Property, there-
fore, may be, and often is, attended with the power of
perpetrating great damage, and, in the estimate of a jury,
becomes an interesting enquiry.'12
The court thus ruled that the plaintiff in a slander case could prove
the wealth of the defendant or "the amount of the defendant's prop-
erty to aggravate damages; and, on the other hand, that the defendant
may recur to the same evidence for the purpose of mitigating
them."113 Punitive damages thus served to temper potential abuses of
power by the wealthy, and concomitantly to vindicate reputational in-
terests in the local community.
In Marshall v. Taylor,"4 the California Supreme Court upheld a
large exemplary damages award in a seduction-by-trickery case.' 15 In
that case, a wealthy, middle-aged owner of a seaside resort impreg-
nated his sixteen-year-old employee after plying her with wine." 6 Up-
holding the exemplary damages award, the court observed:
In actions of the character under present investigation where
the plaintiff is a young girl, poor and friendless, and the de-
fendant a man of mature years, married and wealthy, it may
well be said that the contest is an unequal one; for her youth
and poverty are often weapons of victory, and form a citadel
of strength in the minds of jurors, which is impregnable to
successful attack by the opposition. Thus in her weakness
lies her strength, while a defendant's wealth, his family and
his gray hairs are elements which, when placed before the
jury, often tend only to his own destruction."'
The court did not view the sexual relationship between employer and
employee as "a cold, deliberate transfer of virtue for a considera-
tion,"' 8 but instead noted that the seduction was a product of the
guile of the seducer: "the expressions of friendship, the promises, the
wine, weapons of the seducer, were all there." '119 In couching its opin-
ion in those terms, the court demonstrated the view of punitive dam-
ages as a form of social control against unequal gender relationships
of power.
112. Id. at 27.
113. Id.
114. 98 Cal. 55 (1893).
115. Id
116. Id. at 56-58.
117. Id. at 58.
118. Id. at 61.
119. Id at 62.
[VOL. 64:461
FEDERALISM DERAILED
Contemporary commentary confirms that punitive damages were
seen as an important tool in controlling the conduct of the wealthy.
An 1852 article noted that allowing only compensatory damages
makes wrongdoing "a mere question of profit and loss" for the rich.'
12
As the article went on to note:
It has been a very frequent complaint in England, that the
small fines imposed for drunkenness and disorderly conduct,
afford no check to these indulgences by the rich. It is very
obvious, therefore, that to allow mere pecuniary satisfaction
for wrongs, in the present state of society, would be to put
the laws under the control of the wealthier classes.'
21
As the cases and commentary show, the punitive damages remedy
played an important role in moderating and mediating abuses of
power by wealthy actors. At common law, courts considered the finan-
cial condition and circumstances of the defendant as material evi-
dence; it was well accepted that damages sufficient to punish a day
laborer would be nothing but a slap on the wrist for a wealthy corpora-
tion.1 22 The early cases thus confirm that the jury could consider not
only all the circumstances of aggravation attending the wrongful act,
but in some measure, the wealth of the defendant.
3. Punitive Damages as a Means of Punishing Harmful Conduct Not
Reached by Criminal Process and a Supplement to the Criminal Law.-Puni-
tive damages also served to punish socially harmful conduct, on the
borderline of crime and tort, not prosecuted by public officials. The
Connecticut Supreme Court suggested, for example, that courts
might predicate exemplary damages in libel cases upon "principles
[of] . .. justice and propriety [and allow] somewhat of a penal sanc-
tion, in cases, in which the most atrocious calumny is not punishable
in a criminal prosecution."123 Similarly, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted that punitive damages are appropriate to punish "of-
fenses against morals to which the law has annexed no penalty as pub-
lic wrongs. '
The need to use punitive damages as a supplement to the crimi-
nal law operated in Edwards v. Leavitt.' 25 In this Vermont case, two
120. Vindictive Damages, 4 AM. L.J. 61, 75 (1852).
121. Id.
122. Belknap v. Boston & Me. R.R. Co., 49 N.H. 358, 374 (1870).
123. Bennett v. Hyde, 6 Conn. 24, 28 (1825). Moreover, in addition to supplementing
the criminal code, the court contended that the punitive damages served as an "additional
shield against the malice of the calumniator." Id.
124. McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375, 376 (Pa. 1836).
125. 46 Vt. 126 (1873).
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neighbors in the small Northeast Kingdom town of Walden, Vermont
got into an altercation over a barn they shared." 6 A fight broke out
between the men when one of them sought to place additional hay in
the upper portion of the barn. 27 One of the men then struck his
neighbor with a pitchfork; he "fracture[d] one bone, and [with] an-
other blow on his head, ma[de] a wound two and one half inches
long, cutting to the bone."128 The Vermont Supreme Court rejected
the defendant's argument that exemplary damages were not recog-
nized in cases where a criminal prosecution was pending. 29 The
court reasoned:
It has long been settled in this state, and correctly settled
upon sound reasons, that in actions of this character the jury
may give exemplary damages. It is not an innovation of the
common law, it is the common law. 130
The use of punitive damages as a supplement to the criminal law,
to punish particularly violent conduct likely to carry serious criminal
punishment, was common. Courts upheld punitive damages in aggra-
vated assault cases, such as the $2,750 punitive damages award upheld
by the Illinois Supreme Court in Drohn v. Brewer.' In Drohn, the
rather brutal defendant struck the plaintiff "with a padlock a number
of heavy blows upon the head, inflicting several severe wounds on the
skull, which caused erysipelas, from which the plaintiff suffered sev-
eral months."1 3 2 Courts in other cases awarded punitive damages as
well due to aggravating circumstances: (1) "[a]ssaults with weapons
likely to produce serious injury"; (2) "[a]ssaults on women or on fee-
ble or invalid persons"; (3) "[a]ssaults on children"; (4) "[a]ssaults by
officers"; (5) "[a]ssault by one as a member of a crowd or mob"; (6)
excessive force when "[r]emoving trespassers"; and (7)
"[u]nauthorized surgical operations. "13 Awards in these instances
demonstrate the importance of punitive damages as an adjunct to the
criminal law in serving the goal of punishing socially undesirable and
harmful behavior.
126. Id. at 127.
127. Id. at 127-28.
128. Id. at 128.
129. Id. at 135.
130. Id.
131. 77 Ill. 280, 281 (1875).
132. Id.
133. R.E.H., Annotation, Punitive or Exemplary Damages for Assault, 16 A.L.R. 771, 845-55
(1922).
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4. Protecting the Family as a Social Institution.-As in England,
early punitive damages in the United States protected the family as a
social institution, and courts often upheld damages awards for tor-
tious conduct directed at young, female members of a family. Chief
Justice Gibson of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court acknowledged that
it was not the loss of the daughter's service that was the real gravamen
of actions in response to such conduct."' Punitive damages were
given not only for the loss of the daughter's prospect for a decent
marriage, but also, and importantly, for the comfort and honor of the
injured family.'" 5
a. Breach of Promise to Mary.-The first category of actions
for which families could recover exemplary damages included actions
for breach of the promise to marry, usually in connection with seduc-
tion. "[A]ggravated damages, whether compensatory for a special loss
suffered by plaintiff, or as a punishment to the defendant," were held
to be appropriate in these cases.' 3 6 These cases were the singular ex-
ception to the rule that punitive damages were not allowed in breach
of contract cases.137 To recover exemplary damages, however, the
plaintiff needed proof that the defendant's conduct was wanton and
in willful disregard of her rights.'38 The appropriateness of punitive
damages depended in part on whether the plaintiff and her family
"lost any social advantages" or "suffered any mortification," and
whether the defendant himself "had any social standing."' 39
The essence of a breach of promise to marry action, therefore, is
to compensate the spurned woman and her family for all losses in not
having the marriage contract fulfilled. 14 ° The damages proximately
caused by the breach of the promise to marry "embrace the injury to
the feelings, affections and wounded pride, as well as the loss of mar-
riage." 4' Exemplary damages were also levied in these cases partially
134. McBride v. McLaughlin, 5 Watts 375, 376 (Pa. 1836).
135. Id.
136. Morgan v. Muench, 156 N.W. 819, 823 (Iowa 1916) (affirming a $15,000 award for
breach of promise to marry).
137. Hoy v. Gronoble, 34 Pa. 9, 11 (1859) ("It is an allowance of vindictive damages,
which is not permitted in actions for a breach of contract, with very rare exceptions, per-
haps in none, except the single case of breach of promise of marriage.").
138. Morgan, 156 N.W. at 823.
139. Id.
140. Reed v. Clark, 47 Cal. 194, 199 (1873).
141. Id.
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because of the difficulty of calibrating the value of wounded feelings
and mental anguish suffered by the plaintiff. 142
b. Alienation of Affections.-Courts also protected the family
institution by allowing punitive damages for the tort action of aliena-
tion of affections, which was intended to compensate injured feelings
caused by the defendant's conduct that resulted in the breakup of the
family unit. The essence of an alienation of affections case is a civil
action by one spouse against a third party for interfering with the fam-
ily unit.1 43 There were, however, jurisdictional differences between
the purposes of exemplary damages in alienation of affections cases.
Some jurisdictions assessed exemplary damages to punish and deter
outsiders who destroyed conjugal affection, while others viewed the
remedy as a means to compensate for wounded feelings.' 44
The latter rationale operated in Ford v. Cheever,'45 an alienation of
affections action brought against a saloon keeper for selling the plain-
tiff's habitually drunk husband excessive amounts of liquor and
thereby rendering him in a drunken stupor that led to his death.146
The widow recovered a verdict of $1,500, which included exemplary
damages. 47 Ordering a new trial, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled
that the new jury had to be instructed that exemplary damages are not
for punishment, but to assuage the injured or wounded feelings of the
plaintiff. 4 '
The compensatory aspect of exemplary damages was also present
in Williams v. Williams,'49 where a daughter-in-law deserted by her hus-
band sued her mother-in-law for alienating the affections of her hus-
142. Id The court in Reed noted that one solution to the inaccuracy of calculating these
damages was to permit "great latitude" in the introduction of evidence. Id. Such evidence
would include how many of the plaintiff's close friends and family knew of the marriage
and its breach, since broad knowledge by social acquaintances would lead to greater "an-
noyance and mutual suffering." Id.
143. L.C. Warden, Annotation, Punitive orExemplary Damages in Action by SpouseforAliena-
tion of Affections or Criminal Conversation, 31 A.L.R.2d 713, 716 n.8 (1953).
144. See id. at 715-17, 715 n.7 (summarizing early cases where punitive damages were
awarded for alienation of spousal affection).
145. 63 N.W. 975 (Mich. 1895).
146. Id. at 975-76.
147. Id.
148. See id. at 976 ("While it may not be error to refer to exemplary damages as such, yet
it has never been the policy of the court to permitjuries to award captiously any sum which
may appear just to them, by way of punishment to the offender, but rather to award a sum
in addition to the actual proven damages, as what, in their judgment, constitutes a just
measure of compensation for injury to feelings, in view of the circumstances of each partic-
ular case." (citing Scripps v. Reilly, 38 Mich. 10 (1878))).
149. 37 P. 614 (Colo. 1894).
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band.15' The mother-in-law was assessed an exemplary award of
$12,500 for using "contrivances, by coaxing and threats of disinherit-
ing" the plaintiff in order to break up her son's marriage. 15 ' The
daughter-in-law and her husband had been induced by the mother-in-
law to leave their home in New York to move to Denver.152 After the
couple arrived in Denver, the husband deserted his wife when the
mother-in-law had fraudulently, transferred all of his stocks, bonds,
and other valuables to her name. 153 The Colorado Court of Appeals
viewed the defendant's actions as a "cruel, bitter, unholy persecution,"
and the judge described it as a case of a "weak, vacillating, purposeless
son... [who] was controlled by a dominating woman, to the end that
the tie which bound him might be severed. 1 54 The Colorado Su-
preme Court echoed this sentiment, and found that the mother-in-law
demonstrated "a wanton and reckless disregard of the plaintiffs rights
and feelings," which was the proper foundation for exemplary dam-
ages under Colorado law.
15 5
c. Punitive Liability for Criminal Conversation.-In the 1828
case of Sanborn v. Neilson,156 the New Hampshire Supreme Court up-
held an exemplary damages award against the defendant in a criminal
conversation case that arose out of an eleven-year sexual relationship
with the plaintiffs wife.' 57 The tort of criminal conversation was a
civil action in which a cuckold sued his wife's lover to assuage his
wounded feelings and the affront to the family as a social unit. Re-
jecting the defense that the plaintiffs wife was a woman of easy virtue,
the court observed that "in order to constitute a defence of this kind,
it must be shown that the wife was permitted, by the husband, to live
openly and publicly in a state of common prostitution. 15 ' Regardless,
evidence of the plaintiff's own infidelity as well as his knowledge of his
wife's indiscretions could mitigate any exemplary damages
awarded.1 5
9
150. Id. at 614.
151. Id.
152. Id at 615.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 621.
155. Id. Similarly, in a 1922 Colorado case, a daughter-in-law obtained a $15,000 award
including exemplary damages against her husband's parents for causing their son to desert
her. McAllister v. McAllister, 209 P. 788, 788 (Colo. 1922).
156. 4 N.H. 501 (1828).
157. Id. at 502-03.
158. Id at 510.
159. Id.
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5. Institutional Liability for Punitive Damages.-During this period,
punitive damages were rarely imposed against institutional defendants
for gross negligence or recklessness. For example, in Wardrobe v. Cali-
fornia Stage Co.,' 6° the California Supreme Court reversed an exem-
plary damages award to a passenger injured when a top-heavy
stagecoach overloaded with passengers overturned. 161 The trial court
instructed the jury to impose damages to prevent future "recklessness
in the conduct of stages to the great peril of passengers."1 6 2 The court
found the plaintiffs action as a means of recovering damage for his
individual injury, "and not as public prosecut[ion] to vindicate the
wrongs of the community." 63 The court thus refused to allow the
plaintiff to recover damages "laid for the benefit of the public. 1 64
There were exceptions to this general trend. For example, in
Whipple v. Walpole,165 punitive damages were assessed against a town
for failing to maintain a bridge, which caused the crippling of the
plaintiff's horses.'66 Similarly, in South & North Alabama Railroad Co. v.
McLendon,167 the Alabama Supreme Court held that a rider of a horse
could recover punitive damages for a railroad company's gross negli-
gence in maintaining a bridge. 6 ' The front feet of the plaintiff's
mare broke through the bridge as he was crossing, throwing the plain-
tiff.1 69 The court found that "the falling of the mare's feet through
the bridge was caused by the breaking of the plank which formed the
covering of the bridge, and which was decayed." 7 ' The court permit-
ted punitive damages and did not even require the plaintiff to show
that the railroad had knowledge of the defect in the bridge because
"[t] he corporation should have employed watchful diligence in keep-
ing the bridge in proper repair." ''
6. Conclusions.-In early American cases, exemplary damages
not only avenged the aggravated tort, but the affront to the common
160. 7 Cal. 118 (1857).
161. Id. at 120.
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Id. The court also noted the general rule against imposing punitive damages
against a principal on the basis of his agent's conduct. Id.
165. 10 N.H. 130 (1839), overruled by Woodman v. Nottingham, 49 N.H. 387 (1870).
166. Id at 132-33.
167. 63 Ala. 266, 266 (1879).
168. Id.
169. Id. at 267.
170. Id. at 267-68.
171. Id. at 275.
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morality.1 7 2 The French sociologist, Emile Durkheim, defined collec-
tive conscience as the "totality of beliefs and sentiments common to
the average members of a society."173 In pre-industrial societies,
crimes and quasi-criminal conduct can be seen as a violation of the
collective conscience.1 74 Punitive damages in early America were re-
flective and supportive of the collective conscience of the day-they
served to remedy violations of the collective conscience and protect
social institutions such as the family. Judge Calabresi notes that the
U.S. Supreme Court has "looked at punitive damages and their func-
tion too single-mindedly. 17 5 This Section has demonstrated that the
Court's single-minded hypothesis of early punitive damages solely as a
remedy for mental distress was incorrect.
176
C. Corporate Punitive Damages (1870-Present)
By the end of the nineteenth century, punitive damages had
evolved into a means of social control against the reckless endanger-
mcnt of the public by the proprietors of railroads, streetcars, coal
mines, and other industrial enterprises. 
17  In the late nineteenth cen-
tury and the early twentieth century, the emphasis on punitive dam-
ages shifted from personal torts to corporate torts committed by the
172. See Grey, supra note 27, at 519 ("Although tort law thus moved away from the crimi-
nal law, it remains rooted in seeking to punish those who violate societal norms.").
173. DURKHEIM, supra note 92, at 38-39.
174. Id.
175. Calabresi, Complexity, supra note 22, at 4 n.1.
176. See also William L. Murfee, Sr., Exemplary Damages, 12 CENT. L.J. 529, 530 (1881)
(classifying early American exemplary damages cases by nature of injury, such as harm to
plaintiffs' domestic relations, reputational interests, property interests, and liberty
interests).
177. For example, Mississippi juries assessed punitive damages against railroads and
other carriers for a variety of negligent and malicious actions, including: wrongfully eject-
ing passengers, e.g., Tri-State Transit Co. of La. v. Worley, 20 So. 2d 477 (Miss. 1945),
Williams v. S. RR. Co., 64 So. 969 (Miss. 1914), Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Reid, 46 So. 146 (Miss.
1908); carrying passengers past their stations, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Ramsay, 127 So. 725
(Miss. 1930), Mobile & 0. R.R. Co. v. Moreland, 61 So. 424 (Miss. 1913); accosting patrons
in insulting fashions, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Hickman, 111 So. 588 (Miss. 1927), Ill. Cent.
R.R. Co. v. Cox, 100 So. 520 (Miss. 1924), Mobile, J. & K. C. R.R. Co. v. Kranfield, 46 So. 71
(Miss. 1908), Richberger v. Am. Exp. Co., 18 So. 922 (Miss. 1896); failing to stop when
signaled, e.g., Bums v. Ala. & V. R.R. Co., 47 So. 640 (Miss. 1908), S. Ry. Co. v. Lanning, 35
So. 417 (Miss. 1903); failing to care for known sick, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Smith, 59 So. 87
(Miss. 1912); refusing to carry the blind, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Smith, 37 So. 643 (Miss.
1904); allowing insults and fights, e.g., Gulf, Mobile & N. R.R. Co. v. Thornberry, 188 So.
545 (Miss. 1939), New Orleans, St. Louis & Chi. R.R. Co. v. Burke, 53 Miss. 200 (1876);
willful delaying of passengers, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Hawkins, 74 So. 775 (Miss. 1917); and
obstructing highway crossings, e.g., Ill. Cent. R.R. v. Engle, 60 So. 1 (Miss. 1912). See Alfred
G. Nichols, Jr., Comment, Punitive Damages in Mississippi-A Brief Survey, 37 Miss. LJ. 131,
138-39 (1965) (collecting these cases).
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agents of industrial corporations. Punitive damages were reconceptu-
alized and transferred from a remedy designed to punish one-on-one
torts to a remedy designed to deal with conduct that recklessly endan-
gered the public. The first awards imposed against common carriers
were based on vicarious liability for the intentional torts of employ-
ees, 178 and these generally came during the second half of the nine-
teenth century. 179  For example, a twenty-year-old female school
teacher was awarded $1,000 in exemplary damages after being kissed
five or six times by a harassing railroad conductor.18 0 Similarly, inGoddard v. Grand Trunk Railway,18' punitive damages were awarded to
a railway passenger subjected to "coarse, profane, and grossly insult-ing" language by a brakeman.'8 2 The brakeman retained the passen-
ger's ticket and denied that he ever received it, then accused thepassenger of boarding without paying. "[T] he brakeman called the
plaintiff a liar, charged him with attempting to avoid the payment ofhis fare, and with having done the same thing before, and threatened
to split his head open and spill his brains right there on the spot.""8 4
He then leaned over the plaintiff and "brought his fist close down tohis face, and shaking it violently, told him not to yip, if he did he
would spot him, that he was a damned liar, that he never handed him
his ticket."18 5 The jury was instructed that the case was a proper one
178. Vicarious punitive liability for the reckless acts of agents was well established by the1850s. For example, the Iowa Supreme Court upheld a punitive damages award against a
stagecoach company for employing a known drunkard as a driver in Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4Greene 555, 560 (Iowa 1854). See also Peck v. Neil, 19 F. Cas. 79 (C.C.D. Ohio 1842) (No.10,892) (ruling that stagecoach company was liable for exemplary damages based upon the
recklessness of their driver). But see Wardrobe v. Cal. Stage Co., 7 Cal. 118, 120 (1857)(holding that exemplary damages could not be imposed against a stagecoach company for
the negligence of its employee).
179. See, e.g., Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Osborne, 30 S.W. 21 (Ky. 1895) (upholding
a $1,000 punitive damages award against a railroad company when its employee, while
working on a train leased to another company, forcibly ejected a passenger from a moving
car); Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martino, 18 S.W. 1066 (Tex. 1892) (upholding a $2,020.45 puni-tive damages award against a railroad company whose conductor struck and threatened a
female passenger).
180. Craker v. Chi. & N.W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657, 659-61 (1875). Although the WisconsinSupreme Court, in reviewing the award, explicitly stated that exemplary damages could notbe assessed against the railroad company for the unauthorized acts of its employee, the
court held that the company could be liable for "compensatory damages," including dam-
ages for mental suffering, and it refused to set aside the award. Id, at 675-79. This seems a
clear case of exemplary damages masquerading as compensatory damages.
181. 57 Me. 202 (1869).
182. Id. at 212.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id
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for exemplary damages, and they returned a verdict of nearly
$5,000. 186
Although punitive damages were available under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, the general rule was that they could not be as-
sessed against a corporation for the acts of its agents unless there was
proof of the company's involvement, approval, or ratification. In Ha-
gan v. Providence & Worcester Railroad Co.,1
8 7 a railroad passenger was
wrongfully ejected from a railroad car. 88 The plaintiff gave his ticket
to the conductor in the first-class car but subsequently entered into
the second-class car."8 9 The ticket collector in the second-class com-
partment did not believe the passenger and had him forcefully ejected
at the next stop. °90 The plaintiff sought exemplary damages from the
railroad for its agent's actions.191 The trial judge instructed the jury
on vicarious punitive liability:
[Plunitive or vindictive damages, or smart money, were not
to be allowed as against the principal, unless the principal
participated in the wrongful act of the agent, expressly or
impliedly, by his conduct, authorizing it or approving
it, either before or after it was committed. 192
1. Shifting the Focus to Corporate Wrongdoing.-By the late nine-
teenth and early twentieth century, the focus of punitive damages had
shifted from individual wrongs to wrongs "committed by corporate
agents typically involving defective operations or gross carelessness in
the production of goods or services. 193 Corporate wrongdoers such
as common carriers had the potential of causing potential injury to
large numbers of the general public.194 High-handed or arrogant cor-
186. Id at 203-04.
187. 3 R.I. 88 (1854).
188. Id. at 88-89.
189. Id. at 88.
190. Id. at 88-89.
191. Id. at 89.
192. Id. at 90. Agreeing with the instruction, the court observed that in cases where "the
principal is prosecuted for the tortious act of his servant, unless there is proof in the cause
to implicate the principal and make him particeps criminis of his agent's act," the principal
should not be liable for punitive damages. Id at 91.
193. TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). See generally Seymour D. Thompson, Liability of Corporations for Exemplaiy Damages, 41
CENT. L.J. 308, 308 (1895).
194. See, e.g., Frink & Co. v. Coe, 4 Greene 555, 559 (Iowa 1854) ("The alarming in-
crease of railroad, steamboat and stage disasters, the frightful destruction of life, and limbs
and property, call loudly for a strict enforcement of the most exemplary rules in reference
to common carriers.").
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porate policies by common carriers also became the basis for punitive
damages by the first part of the nineteenth century. 1 5
This reconceptualizaton also served to buttress civil liberties. For
example, in a Texas case, a railroad was punished for a conductor's
"excessive force and violence" in ejecting a woman passenger "from
the car of the whites, and removing her to that of the negroes."'1 6
Similarly, in a California case, punitive damages were awarded against
a streetcar company whose conductor refused to let a passenger board
and stated, "We don't take colored people in the Cars."197
Courts imposed punitive damages for other deliberate or reckless
conduct as well. For example, in Pine Bluff & Arkansas River Railway
Co. v. Washington,' a female passenger received $2,000 in punitive
damages after a railroad brakeman deliberately shot her in the arm. 99
The court observed that because it was "the duty of the brakeman to
look after the comfort and safety of the passengers," he breached the
public trust, thus justifying exemplary damages.2 °0
Legislation also played a role in this reconceptualization. The
Kentucky wrongful death statute, for example, which was enacted in1854, provided for punitive damages for conduct that was predicated
upon gross negligence or recklessness:
That if the life of any person or persons is lost or destroyed
by the willful neglect of another person or persons, company
or companies, corporation or corporations, their agents or
servants, then the personal representative of the deceased
shall have the right to sue such person or persons, company
or companies, corporation or corporations, and recover pu-
nitive damages for the loss or destruction of the life
aforesaid.2 °1
2. Corporate Punitive Liability for Reckless Indifference and Decep-
tion.-In cases involving carriers, punitive damages were typically im-
posed where there was "'reckless indifference to the safety of...
passengers,' or 'intentional misconduct' on the part of the agents and
officers of the company. '2 2 For example, in Frink & Co. v. Coe, puni-
195. See Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 45, at 1294-97.
196. Int'l & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Miller, 28 S.W. 233, 234 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894), affd, 29 S.W.
235 (Tex. 1895).
197. Pleasants v. N. B. & M. R.R Co., 34 Cal. 586, 589 (1868).
198. 172 S.W. 872 (Ark. 1915).
199. Id at 872-73.
200. Id at 874.
201. Chiles v. Drake, 29 Ky. 146, 150 (1859) (quoting ch. 964, 1853 Ky. Acts 175).202. Maysville & Lexington R.R. Co. v. Herrick, 13 Bush 122, 127 (Ky. 1877).
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tive damages were awarded against a stagecoach company for employ-
ing a known drunkard to drive a stagecoach between Chicago and
Rock Island, Illinois. 20 3 The Iowa Supreme Court upheld exemplary
damages awarded to a passenger seriously injured when the stage-
coach was involved in an accident:
In a case of gross negligence on the part of a stage proprie-
tor, such as the employment of a known drunken driver, and
where a passenger has been injured in consequence of such
negligence, we think exemplary damages should be
entertained.
20 4
The shift in emphasis for punitive damages resulted from the role
corporations such as railroads, streetcar companies, coal mines, and
utilities played in causing an unprecedented epidemic of death and
serious injuries. Legal historian William Nelson describes an era
where accidents overshadowed diseases:
In the nineteenth century, approximately 10% of all coal
miners died in mine accidents during the course of their ca-
reers, while at the turn of the century one in every 5000 fac-
tory employees died annually from accidents. The worst
victims of all were railroad employees: in 1901, one out of
every 399 railroad employees was killed in an accident, while
one out of every 26 was injured. For train crews in that year,
one out of every 137 was killed, which translated into a
nearly 20% probability of accidental death over a twenty-five
year career. These high accident rates resulted from coup-
ling industry's "cavalier attitude" that "[t]here's a dozen
[new workers] waiting when one drops out" as a result of "his
own bad luck," with the real "hazards of axles, mules, sting-
ing insects, boiling laundry kettles, tetanus-inducing rusty im-
plements and barbed wire, impure water, and spoiled food."
Given the pattern of accidents and illness, it is not surprising
that as late as 1920 average life expectancy in the United
States was only 54.1 years.
2 0 5
The Frink court upheld punitive damages against the stagecoach pro-
prietor with this epidemic of accidents in mind. The court observed
that the carnage caused by new modes of transportation created ap-
palling social problems:
203. 4 Greene 555, 555 (Iowa 1854).
204. Id. at 559.
205. William E. Nelson, From Fairness to Efficiency: The Transformation of Tort Law in New
York, 1920-1980, 47 BuFF. L. REv. 117, 174-75 (1999) (footnotes omitted) (alterations in
original).
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The alarming increase of railroad, steamboat and stage disas-
ters, the frightful destruction of life, and limbs and property,
call loudly for a strict enforcement of the most exemplary
rules in reference to common carriers.2 °6
Courts were nevertheless divided as to the conditions for finding
corporate complicity with punitive damages. As one contemporary
commentator observed, some courts continued to follow the rule that
exemplary damages may be awarded against a corporation
under circumstances where such damages would be awarded
against an individual, if the injurious act was previously au-
thorized or subsequently ratified, by the board of directors
or other governing body of the corporation-in which case
the act is deemed to be the act of the corporation, in the
same sense as when a natural person acts for himself without
the intervention of an agent.2 0 7
Railroad derailment cases were a leading example of the poten-
tial for corporate decisions to endanger the public, not just the indi-
vidual plaintiff. However, courts were split as to whether conduct akin
to "reckless indifference" was required to sustain a punitive damages
award. For example, in Maysville & Lexington Railroad Co. v. Herrick,
the Kentucky Supreme Court concluded that
The absence of slight care in the management of a railroad
train, or in keeping a railroad track in repair, is gross negli-
gence; and to enable a passenger to recover punitive dam-
ages, in a case like this, it is not necessary to show the
absence of all care, or "reckless indifference to the safety
of ... passengers," or "intentional misconduct" on the part
of the agents and officers of the company.2" 8
In Rutherford v. Shreveport & Houston Railroad Co.,2°9 the Supreme
Court of Louisiana found that punitive damages could not be assessed
against the defendant in a derailment case, absent elements of willful
or wanton disregard of the company's obligations to its passengers. 210
Similarly, in an Alabama derailment case in which the injured passen-
ger sought punitive damages for the railway's "failure to keep in good
and safe condition the switch at the point of the accident," the court
observed that although the railroad had failed to properly maintain
206. Frink, 4 Greene at 559.
207. Thompson, supra note 193, at 309.
208. 13 Bush 122, 127 (Ky. 1877).
209. 6 So. 644 (La. 1889).
210. Id.
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the track, if the failure to remedy the defect constituted simple negli-
gence, no punitive damages could be awarded.21 1
Danger to public safety was the sine qua non of the punitive dam-
ages awarded in Denver & Rio Grande Railway v. Harris.12 In Harris,
the Supreme Court of the Territory of New Mexico affirmed a trial
court's allowance of punitive damages against the officers of a railroad
whose forcible seizure of another railway in the territory resulted in
serious injury to the plaintiff.213 The U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
punitive damages award with the following observation:
The doctrine of punitive damages should certainly apply in a
case like this, where a corporation, by its controlling officers,
wantonly disturbed the peace of the community, and by the
use of violent means endangered the lives of citizens in order
to maintain rights, for the vindication of which, if they ex-
isted, an appeal should have been made to the judicial tribu-
nals of the country.214
In another notable case, a steamboat company was assessed puni-
tive damages in a Connecticut court for failing to assist a passenger
injured by the company's negligence. 5 The plaintiff had broken his
leg after an insufficiently secured chain-box struck and knocked him
overboard while he was on the deck of the steamboat.21 6 The steam-
boat's employees did not seek medical attention for the plaintiff, and
left him on the dock. 7
These cases demonstrate that the conduct punishable by punitive
damages varies with the functions the remedy is permitted to play.
Punitive damages may serve as a remedy to control corporate conduct
on the borderline between crime and tort that endangers the larger
society. In this vein, they were used to counter unreasonable risks of
harm caused by railroads, utilities, and streetcar companies.
3. Twentieth-Century Expansion of Punitive Damages.-In the early
decades of the twentieth century, punitive damages evolved to punish
companies for deceptive "business practices or relations of corpora-
211. Richmond & D. R. Co. v. Vance, 9 So. 574, 575-76 (Ala. 1898).
212. 122 U.S. 597 (1887).
213. Id. at 598-99.
214. Id. at 610.
215. Hall v. Conn. River Steamboat Co., 13 Conn. 319 (1839).
216. Id. at 320-21.
217. Id. at 321; see also Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry. Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107
(1893) (noting that "[t]he recovery of damages, beyond compensation for the injury re-
ceived, byway of punishing the guilty, and as an example to deter others from offending in
like manner, is here clearly recognized").
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dons with customers, employees and the public in general, as ... their
competitive behavior with other enterprises. "218 By the late nine-
teenth century, punitive damages were already being imposed for op-
pressive practices by creditors. The Supreme Court of Alabama stated
that exemplary damages were appropriate if a creditor's use of a gar-
nishment was "vexatious, as well as wrongful. '219 The remedy ex-
panded to include sharp business practices, as in a 1900 Minnesota
case where the McCormick Harvesting Machine Company maliciously
placed a lien on a farmer's seed grain knowing full well that a secured
creditor had no such right to exempt property.22 ° Similarly, in Aetna
Life Insurance Co. v. Love,22 1 the court upheld a $2,000 punitive dam-
ages award against an insurer who wrongfully ordered an autopsy of a
policyholder before paying benefits under an insurance policy. 222
After the Second World War, as the American economy became
more complex and bureaucratic, punitive damages expanded to
counter new dangers from environmental pollution, 223 defective
products, 224 substandard medicine, 2 5 employment discrimination226
218. TVT Records v. Island DefJam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 420-21 (S.D.N.Y.
2003); see also Clancy v. Reid-Ward Motor Co., 170 S.W.2d 161, 165 (Mo. Ct. App. 1943)(upholding a punitive damages award against a seller who fraudulently turned back odom-
eters); Jones v. W. Side Buick Auto. Co., 93 S.W. 2d 1083, 1089 (Mo. Ct. App. 1936)(same); Saberton v. Greenwald, 66 N.E.2d 224, 228 (Ohio 1946) (holding that punitive
damages could be recovered where a Watchmaker fraudulently sold a used watch as new).
219. Hays v. Anderson, 57 Ala. 374, 378 (1876) (quoting Barber v. Ferrill, 57 Ala. 446,
448 (1876)).
220. Matteson v. Munroe, 83 N.W. 153, 153-54 (Minn. 1900); see also Thompson v. Mod-
ern Sch. of Bus. & Correspondence, 190 P. 451 (Cal. 1920). In Thompson, a correspon-
dence school was punished for a fraudulent scheme that involved enticing students to
enroll in a bogus program based upon the false promises of a guaranteed salary and jobplacement. Id. at 451-54. The plaintiffs received actual damages of $235 and "community
damage," as well as exemplary damages, amounting to $5,000. Id. at 451. For a summary
of cases discussing whether punitive damages can be awarded in tort cases based on fraud-
ulent sales transactions, see K.A. Drechsler, Annotation, Punitive or Exemplary Damages in
Action in Tort Based on Fraudulent Sale, 165 A.L.R. 614 (1946).
221. 149 S.W.2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App. 1941).
222. Id at 1078.
223. E.g., Espinoza v. Roswell Tower, Inc., 910 P.2d 940 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995) (affirming
punitive damages imposed against defendants who failed to comply with environmental
regulations for the disposal of asbestos).
224. E.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co. Ltd., 655 F.2d 650 (5th Cir. 1981) (upholding
punitive damages against Honda for poor design of the passenger compartment of a sub-
compact car).
225. See generally Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Reconceptualizing Punitive Damages in
Medical Malpractice: Targeting Amoral Corporations, Not "Moral Monsters", 47 RUTGERS L. REv.
975 (1995).
226. E.g., Kolstad v. Am. Dental Assoc., 527 U.S. 526 (1999) (holding that punitive dam-
ages can be awarded in employment discrimination cases, even if the employer's conduct is
not shown to be independently egregious).
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and other corporate misbehavior. So profound an impact punitive
damages have had on corporate conduct that the movement to consti-
tutionalize punitive damages was a response to the increase in vicari-
ous awards against corporations.227 Corporate malfeasance costs
Americans hundreds of billions of dollars annually and causes an un-
told number of preventable deaths and injuries. Increasingly, the le-
gal sanctions used to deter and punish corporations blend tort and
criminal remedies. The path of punitive damages has been impelled
by the need for a flexible civil remedy to patrol corporate wrongdoing
on the borderline between criminal law and the law of torts. Fortu-
nately, a number of early forward-looking decisions punished compa-
nies that threatened the public safety or the social order.
In Part I, three points have been made about the history of puni-
tive damages. The first is that exemplary damages evolved as a remedy
for government oppression. This chapter of the history of exemplary
damages is a story of how tort law buttressed civil liberties. The sec-
ond point is that the remedy was imported into the United States to
punish extremely aggravated torts. The level of exemplary or vindic-
tive damages was based on the enormity of defendant's conduct
rather than compensation to the plaintiff. The third point is that pu-
nitive damages evolved to constrain corporate misconduct towards the
end of the nineteenth century. The story of punitive damages is in
many respects part of an older story geared toward making corpora-
tions accountable for their policy decisions. Part I has confirmed that
not only the functions, but the conduct punishable by punitive dam-
ages, varied by historical period. The earliest applications of punitive
damages were directed at malicious, willful, or other intentional acts
by individual offenders that upset the public order. The remedy of
punitive damages evolved to express societal disapproval for fraudu-
lent conduct or intolerable rates of injuries and deaths. The next Part
is a study of the corporate backlash against punitive damages.
II. THE CONsTITUTIONALIZATION OF PUNITIvE DAMAGES
A. The States as Tort Remedy Laboratories
Punitive damages have historically followed Justice Brandeis's
suggestion that the states serve as laboratories for experimentation.
The remedy of punitive damages is a mosaic that reflects the history of
state tort law, which in turn reflects local conditions. This remedy is
227. See generally Michael Rustad & Thomas Koenig, The Supreme Court and Junk Social
Science: Selective Distortion in Amicus Briefs, 72 N.C. L. REv. 91 (1993) [hereinafter Selective
Distortion].
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the perfect laboratory for state experimentation, for after two hun-
dred years of imposing punitive damages, there remains no national
consensus about the vocabulary for civil punishment, let alone the
purposes of punitive damages. The Oregon Court of Appeals, for ex-
ample, views punitive damages as a "legal spanking" administered to
bad actors that violate societal norms. 2 28 Many jurisdictions use the
term "punitive damages," but other states use the terms "exemplary
damages," "vindictive damages," or "smart money" to refer to punish-
ment and deterrence through the common law.2 29
1. States That Never Recognized Punitive Damages.-The states have
historically had the complete discretion to decide how and when to
apply the remedy of punitive damages and under what conditions.
Nebraska courts never embraced the remedy of punitive damages,
whereas New Hampshire repudiated the doctrine in a 1986 tort re-
form statute. 2 "° Three other states, Washington, Louisiana, and Mass-
achusetts, refuse to recognize common-law punitive damages and only
recognize the remedy if specifically authorized by statute.231 In the
civil-code jurisdiction of Louisiana, "only compensatory damages, and
not punitive damages, may be recovered in an action for tort. '232
Prior to 1996, Louisiana provided for punitive damages under several
statutes, such as for the reckless transportation of hazardous or toxic
substances.23 Similarly, punitive damages are only available in Massa-
chusetts under the state's wrongful death statute, which is generally
228. Waddill v. Anchor Hocking, Inc., 27 P.3d 1092, 1099 (Or. Ct. App. 2001).
229. See, e.g., Cowen v. Winters, 96 F. 929, 935 (6th Cir. 1899) (observing that the doc-
trine is well settled that, in actions of tort, the jury "may award exemplary, punitive, or
vindictive damages, sometimes called 'smart money'" (quoting Lake Shore & Mich. S. Ry.
Co. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101, 107 (1893))). Colorado also follows the English convention
of using the term "exemplary damages" rather than punitive damages. COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-25-127(2) (West 1997). Alabama alternatively refers to either punitive damages
or vindictive damages. ALA. CODE § 6-5-186 (1993). When New Hampshire recognized the
doctrine, it used all the various terms to refer to punitive damages. Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H.
342 (1872). New Hampshire later abolished the remedy of punitive damages by legislative
decree. N.H. STAT. ANN. § 507:16 (1997).
230. Distinctive Printing & Packaging Co. v. Cox, 443 N.W.2d 566, 574-75 (Neb. 1989)
(recognizing that punitive damages violate provisions of the Nebraska Constitution); N.H.
REv. STAT. ANN. § 507:16; Panas v. Harakis, 529 A.2d 976, 986 (N.H. 1987) (stating that
punitive damages are prohibited but that compensatory damages may take into account
the nature of the act).
231. Fisher Props, Inc. v. Arden-Mayfair, Inc., 276 P.2d 8, 23 (Wash. 1986); Int'l Har-
vester Credit Corp. v. Seale, 518 So. 2d 1039, 1041 (La. 1988); Santana v. Registrars of
Voters, 502 N.E.2d 132, 135 (Mass. 1986).
232. Breaux v. Simon, 104 So. 2d 168, 170 (La. 1958).
233. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 2315.3 (West 1997). This law was repealed by 1996 La.
Acts, 1st Ex. Sess., No. 2, § 1.
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compensatory in effect, but which also contains a penal element.234
Washington does not allow punitive damages on the grounds that the
doctrine violates public policy and is "unsound in principle.
235
2. Punitive Damages Backlash in the States.-Consistent with the
new federalism,23 6 the business community has convinced state legisla-
tors to scale back punitive damages. Since 1986, a total of thirty-one
states enacted one or more new restrictions on the recovery of puni-
tive damages.237 In 2003 alone, Arkansas, Colorado, Idaho, Missis-
sippi, Montana, and Texas instituted new limitations on punitive
damages.238 The most recent reform of punitive damages came in
2004 when Mississippi capped punitive damages on a sliding scale cali-
brated to the net worth of the defendant.
23 9
States that recognize the remedy of punitive damages have almost
always required formal procedures for conducting an excessiveness re-
view of the amount of punitive damages.240 The postverdict proce-
dures of the states tend to be far more extensive than the review
mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court. 24 1 A quiet revolution has been
occurring in the states, which makes it more difficult for plaintiffs to
recover punitive damages. The states provide defendants with a daz-
zling array of procedural and substantive protections in punitive dam-
234. See Burt v. Meyer, 508 N.E.2d 598, 600-02 (Mass. 1987).
235. Maki v. Aluminum Bldg. Prods., 436 P.2d 186, 187 (Wash. 1968).
236. The new federalism of the Burger/Rehnquist Court has increased the role of the
states as important laboratories for experimentation. See, e.g., A.E. Dick Howard, State
Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REv. 873, 874-79
(1976).
237. Am. Tort Reform Ass'n, Tort Reform Record, July 13, 2004, at 17, available at http://
www.atra.org/files.cgi/7802_Record6-04.pdf.
238. Id. at 18-19, 21, 23-24, 28.
239. Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(3) (Supp. 2005).
240. E.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-23(b); ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-64-124 (Michie 1987); CoLo.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-102(2) (West Supp. 2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1)(d) (West
Supp. 2004); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/2-1207 (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221 (7) (c); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Michie Supp. 2003); Las Palmas Assoc. v. Las Palmas
Ctr. Assoc., 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 301, 321-22 (Ct. App. 1991); Pitts Truck Air, Inc. v. Mack
Trucks, Inc., 328 S.E.2d 416, 418 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); O'Dell v. Basabe, 810 P.2d 1082,
1090 (Idaho 1991); Med. Mut. Liab. Ins. Soc'y of Md. v. Evander, 609 A.2d 353, 370 (Md.
App. 1992); Bradley v. Hubbard Broad., Inc., 471 N.W.2d 670, 678-79 (Minn. Ct. App.
1991); Republic Ins. Co. v. Hires, 810 P.2d 790, 792-93 (Nev. 1991); State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co. v. Zubiate, 808 S.W.2d 590, 605-06 (Tex. App. 1991).
241. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 6-11-23(b) (requiring the trial court to conduct a postverdict
hearing upon motion of either party, where the court must independently reassess the
"nature, extent, and economic impact" of punitive damages awards); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-21-102(2) (permitting the court to set aside or reduce punitive damages awards,
notwithstanding the jury's verdict, if the court assesses that the purposes of punitive dam-
ages (such as deterrence) have been achieved).
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ages litigation because of the tort reform movement. 242 States have
enacted a wide-ranging number of procedural rules protecting de-
fendants in punitive damages litigation.243 A growing number of
states bifurcate punitive damages from the compensatory damages
phase of the trial in order to protect the rights of defendants. For
example, while most states permit the use of wealth in determining
the size of punitive damages,244 with bifurcation they can place restric-
tions that prevent the abuse of such potentially inflammatory evidence
during the assessment of compensatory damages. 245
The vast majority of the states have increased the standard of
proof for punitive damages from preponderance of the evidence to
clear and convincing evidence.246 Colorado is alone among the states
242. The state tort reforms have been spearheaded by the same corporate and insur-
ance groups seeking relief from excessive damage awards in the U.S. Supreme Court:
Numerous business interests have combined in every state to limit the remedy of
punitive damages. For example, the Product Liability Coordinating Committee
(PLCC) was formed in 1987 to coordinate the activities of eight organizations:
The American Tort Reform Association (ATRA), the Product Liability Alliance,
the Business Roundtable, the United States Chamber of Commerce, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Chemical Manufacturers Association, the Coali-
tion for Uniform Product Liability Laws, and the National Federation of Indepen-
dent Businesses.
Michael L. Rustad, Nationalizing Tort Law: The Republican Attack on Women, Blue Collar Work-
ers and Consumers, 48 RUTGERS L. REv. 673, 724 n.245 (1996). ATRA-sponsored state groups
have introduced comprehensive tort reform legislation scaling back punitive damages in a
number of states. See Michael Bradfor, Tort Reform Proponents See Boost from Bush Plan, Bus.
INS., Feb. 17, 1992, at 2 ("ATRA will be heading back to 20 state legislatures in an effort to
protect tort reform gains in recent years or fight bills that would expand liability."); see also
Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 148 (documenting corporate
America's amici participation in the constitutionalization of punitive damages).
243. See supra note 240.
244. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., CTS. &JUD. PROC. § 10-913(a) (making evidence of the
defendant's financial means admissible for determining punitive damages in personal in-
jury cases, but only after there has been a finding of liability); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(7) (noting that if there has been a finding of liability for punitive damages, the court
must consider the defendant's financial condition and net worth in a separate
proceeding).
245. Bifurcation divides the trial into the compensatory damages phase and the punitive
damages phase. The purpose of bifurcation is to protect the defendant from unfair
prejudice that might result if the jury hears evidence for determining the amount of puni-
tive damages that would be inadmissible for determining compensatory damages. Courts
generally restrict the use of the financial evidence of the defendant to the second phase of
the trial. E.g., CAL. CIV. CODE ANN. § 3295(d) (West 1997); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & Jun.
PROC. § 10-913(a); Mor. CODE ANN. § 27-1-221(7); NEV. REv. STAT. § 42.005(4); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-18-1(2) (2002); Hodges v. S.C. Toof & Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn.
1992).
246. ALA. CODE § 6-11-20(a); ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020(b) (Michie 2004); CAL. Ctv.
CODE ANN. § 3 294(a); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(2)(b); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1(b)
(2000); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-51-3-2 (Michie 1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1(1) (a) (West
1998); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1994); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 411.184(2) (Banks-Bald-
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requiring plaintiffs to prove the predicates for punitive damages "be-
yond a reasonable doubt. '24 7 The remainder of this Part examines
how the Court came to constitutionalize punitive damages at a time
when the states were open for business as laboratories for tort reform.
3. Early Supreme Court Precedents Upholding Common-Law Civil Pun-
ishment.-The U.S. Supreme Court's first opinions on the doctrine of
exemplary damages arose in admiralty with the case of The Amiable
Nancy.248 In that case Justice Joseph Story found the seizure of a Hai-
tian vessel and the theft of its cargo by an armed American privateer
as "a case of gross and wanton outrage, without any just provocation
or excuse." 249 Justice Story would have found an ample justification
for punishment of this egregious marine trespass "in the shape of ex-
emplary damages, the proper punishment which belongs to such law-
less misconduct. '250 Because the ship owners had "neither directed
[the attack], nor countenanced it, nor participated in it in the slight-
est degree," Justice Story ruled that vindictive damages could not be
awarded.251
In Day v. Woodworth,252 the Court noted that in tort actions:
It is a well-established principle of the common law, that in
actions of trespass and all actions on the case for torts, ajury
may inflict what are called exemplary, punitive, or vindictive
damages upon a defendant, having in view the enormity of
his offence rather than the measure of compensation to the
plaintiff.25
3
The Day Court acknowledged that "if repeated judicial decisions for
more than a century are to be received as the best exposition of what
the law is, the question [of the propriety of punitive damages] will not
win 2003); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20, subd. l(a) (West 2000); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1-
221(5); NEV. REv. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(1) (2003); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(D)(3) (Anderson Supp. 2003); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 9
(West 1987); OR. REv. STAT. § 31.730(1) (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op.
Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 21-1-4.1 (Michie 1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-
1 (1)(a); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675, 681 (Ariz. 1986); Masaki v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 780 P.2d 566, 575 (Haw. 1989); Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353,
1363 (Me. 1985); Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 657 (Md. 1992); Hodges,
833 S.W.2d at 901; Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 457-68 (Wis. 1980).
247. COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-25-127(2).
248. 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 546 (1818).
249. Id. at 558.
250. Id.
251. Id at 559.
252. 54 U.S. (13 How.) 362 (1851).
253. Id. at 371.
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admit of argument."25 4 The Court concluded that juries had always
been given the discretion of deciding the level and appropriateness of
imposing punitive damages:
By the common as well as by statute law, men are often pun-
ished for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts, by means of
a civil action, and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or
punishment, given to the party injured. In many civil ac-
tions, such as libel, slander, seduction, &c., the wrong done
to the plaintiff is incapable of being measured by a money
standard; and the damages assessed depend on the circum-
stances, showing the degree of moral turpitude or atrocity of
the defendant's conduct, and may properly be termed exem-
plary or vindictive rather than compensatory.255
Following Day, the United States Supreme Court routinely dis-
missed constitutional challenges to corporate punitive damages
awarded by juries in the states. 256 Justice Scalia was the first to observe
that punitive damages and the American law of torts were well estab-
lished in 1868 when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, and
that it was 'Just as clear that no particular procedures were deemed
necessary to circumscribe a jury's discretion regarding the award of
such damages, or their amount. '257 Moreover, a recent review of the
history of the Supreme Court's decisions "dealing with substantive due
process challenges to punitive damages awards reveals that it had not
struck down an award since 1915. "258
In Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Humes,25 9 for example, the defen-
dant railroad appealed a judgment awarded under a Missouri state
statute that permitted a plaintiff to recover double damages for the
killing of a mule. 26" The Court rejected the railroad's argument that
the Missouri statute violated the company's rights under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Due Process
Clause of Missouri's constitution.26' On the due process claim the
Court noted that "[t] he discretion of the jury in such cases is not con-
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. SeeLINDA L. SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 3.1, at 47 & n.7(4th ed. 2000) (collecting cases).
257. Pac. Mut. Life Ins., Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 26-27 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring).
258. Neil B. Stekloff, Note, Raising Five Eyebrows: Substantive Due Process Review of Punitive
Damages Awards after BMW v. Gore, 29 CONN. L. REv. 1797, 1797-98 (1997) (observing that
the historical record is at odds with the BMW Court's view that substantive due process
limits the size of punitive damages).
259. 115 U.S. 512 (1885).
260. Id. at 513.
261. Id. at 523.
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trolled by any very definite rules; yet the wisdom of allowing such addi-
tional damages to be given is attested by the long continuance of the
practice. The Court then quoted from Day, and again observed
that in the "common as well as by statute law, men are often punished
for aggravated misconduct or lawless acts by means of a civil action,
and the damages, inflicted by way of penalty or punishment, given to
the party injured. 263
B. Nineteenth-Century Efforts to Constitutionalize Punitive Damages
The railroads were at the center of the first due process chal-
lenges to punitive damages in the late nineteenth century. 26" Four-
teenth Amendment due process challenges were frequently mounted
at any attempt to regulate railroads through exemplary damages. The
Arkansas Supreme Court upheld an exemplary damages statute
against a railway's constitutional challenge to a large punitive damages
award in St. Louis, I. M. & S. Railway Co. v. Paul.265 Under the statute,
the court awarded damages to a group of day laborers who the railway
terminated without paying their wages, and the railroad challenged
the constitutionality of the Arkansas statute as an interference with its
property rights in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
266
The Arkansas statute also provided for double damages, which
were challenged by the railway on due process grounds as unreasona-
bly excessive. 26 7 The court ruled that the exemplary damages provi-
sion permitting the "doubling [of] the value of the property
destroyed, or of the damage caused, upon refusal of the railway com-
pany, for thirty days after notice of the injury committed, to pay the
actual value of the property," was constitutional. 268 This and many
other constitutional disputes of the late nineteenth century and early
twentieth century prefigured today's constitutional challenges to the
imposition of punitive damages by juries in state courts.2 69
262. Id. at 521.
263. Id. (quoting Day v. Woodworth, 54 U.S. 362, 371 (1851) (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
264. For background on how the railroad industry forced significant innovations in the
law in areas of federalism, tort, labor, corporate law, eminent domain and land use, and
civil rights, see JAMES W. ELY, JR., RAILROADS AND AMERICAN LAW vii (2001).
265. 40 S.W. 705 (Ark. 1897).
266. Id. at 705.
267. Id. at 708.
268. Id. at 708-09.
269. See Colby, supra note 94, at 643-47 (discussing early constitutional challenges to
punitive damages).
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Early attacks on the remedy sometimes focused on the need for
greater procedural protections for defendants.27 ° The argument was
also made that punitive damages were a windfall paid to private indi-
viduals.271 Defendants also argued that punitive damages should be
tried under the beyond a reasonable doubt standard rather than the
usual standard of preponderance of the evidence.272 Finally, defend-
ants challenged the sufficiency of jury instructions and frequently ar-
gued that courts wrongfully gave unfettered discretion to award
punitive damages.273
C. The Constitutional Rights of Corporate Persons
The novel argument that corporations enjoy constitutional rights,
like natural persons, was first advanced by corporate attorneys repre-
senting the railroads, mining companies, and other powerful inter-
ests.2 7 4 By its express terms, the Fourteenth Amendment proscribes
the states from abridging the "privileges or immunities of citizens" or
depriving any "person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law."
275
The Supreme Court was skeptical of early attempts to accord cor-
porations the status of "citizens" or "persons" under the Constitution.
For example, in the 1858 case of Covington Drawbridge Co. v. Shep-
herd,27 6 Chief Justice Roger Taney reasoned that corporations could
not be considered citizens:
Now, no one, we presume, ever supposed that the artificial
being created by an act of incorporation could be a citizen of
a State in the sense in which that word is used in the Consti-
tution of the United States, and the averment [in another
case that a corporation itself was a citizen] was rejected be-
cause the matter averred was simply impossible. 277
270. See, e.g., Fay v. Parker, 53 N.H. 342, 384-97 (1872).
271. For example, a commentator in 1881 argued that "even if it be allowable to fine the
defendants in a civil court, there seems no reason why the plaintiff should be the recipi-
ent." Edward C. Eliot, Exemplary Damages, 29 AM. L. Rxc. 570, 573 (1881).
272. See, e.g., Murphy v. Hobbs, 5 P. 119, 121 (Colo. 1884).
273. See, e.g., Hanna v. Sweeney, 62 A. 785, 785 (Conn. 1906) (accepting the defendant's
argument that a certain instruction left too much discretion with the jury for determining
punitive damages). See generally Fay, 53 N.H. 342.
274. E.g., Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26, 28 (1889) (accepting
the defendant-railroad company's argument that it received constitutional due process
protection).
275. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
276. 61 U.S. 227 (1857).
277. Id. at 233-34.
[VOL. 64:461
FEDERALISM DERAILED
Corporate attorneys would nonetheless make the argument later that
the Court should strike down various state regulations through an ex-
pansive reading of Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause.
In Paul v. Virginia,2 78 an insurance agent appealed his conviction
in a Virginia state court for issuing a fire insurance policy on behalf of
a foreign insurance company without a license to sell insurance in
Virginia. 27' Although the Virginia state statute at issue did not require
domestic companies to obtain such licenses, 280 the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the insurance agent's argument that requiring a li-
cense for agents of out-of-state companies violated the Privileges and
Immunities Clause.28 ' The Court reasoned that "Corporations are
not citizens within [the] meaning [of the Privileges and Immunities
Clause] ."212 The Court refused to extend the concept of citizens from
natural persons to "artificial persons created by the legislature, and
possessing only the attributes which the legislature has prescribed. 283
The Court's refusal to extend constitutional rights to artificial corpo-
rations in turn stymied any argument that corporations were entitled
to due process rights.
28 4
The Court summarily rejected substantive due process challenges
to punitive damages throughout the late nineteenth century. In an
1877 case, Justice Miller wrote about the tendency of unsuccessful cor-
porate defendants to seek refuge in the Court; he observed that "there
exists some strange misconception of the scope of this provision as
found in the fourteenth amendment."28 1 Justice Miller criticized the
tendency of every unsuccessful litigant in state courts to seek refuge in
the highest court despite "the merits of the legislation on which such
a decision may be founded."
286
278. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868).
279. I& at 169.
280. Id at 170.
281. Id at 182.
282. Id. at 177.
283. Id.
284. The contemporary understandings of due process were expressed by Justices Curtis
and Field. Justice Curtis, citing Lord Coke, described the phrase, "due process of law" as
"intended to convey the same meaning as the words, 'by the law of the land,' in Magna
Charta." Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272,
276 (1856) (citing 2 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 50); see Magna Carta ch. 39 (1215), reprinted inJ.C. HOLT, MAGNA CARTA 461
(1965). Similarly, Justice Field noted that the original purpose of due process of law in
England was "in cases where life, liberty and property were affected ... to secure the
subject against the arbitrary action of the Crown, and to place [citizens] under the protec-
tion of the law." Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 519 (1885).
285. Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104 (1877).
286. Id.
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In 1866, things changed dramatically for corporations pursuing
such challenges. In striking down a state tax on railway beds, the
Court in Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co.28 7 revisited
the question of whether corporations were persons entitled to protec-
tion under the Fourteenth Amendment.2"' For the first time in Amer-
ican history, the Court held that corporations are persons within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause.2 9
The concept of corporate personhood was so clear to the Court
that it declined to hear oral argument on the issue:
The Court does not wish to hear argument on the question
whether the provision in the Fourteenth Amendment to the
Constitution, which forbids a State to deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws, ap-
plies to these corporations. We are all of opinion that it
does.29 °
Corporate personhood was too well established to be questioned
by the turn of the century, when the Court in Smyth v. Ames 9' ob-
served: "That corporations are persons within the meaning of this
amendment is settled."29 2 Empowered by these decisions, corpora-
tions mounted frequent equal protection challenges to new state stat-
utes regulating their activities. The Court's recognition of corporate
personhood made it possible for companies to challenge both statutes
and the common law on substantive due process grounds. This
helped to usher in the economic liberties age of Lochner v. New
York. 2 9 3
With Lochner, the Court in 1905 began reading far-reaching eco-
nomic liberties and property rights into the Due Process Clause. In
that case, the Court struck down an 1895 New York statute limiting the
working hours of bakery employees to a maximum of ten hours a day
and sixty hours per week. 294 An employer that was found guilty of
287. 118 U.S. 394 (1885).
288. Id. at 396.
289. Id.
290. Id. Just two years later, in Pembina Consolidated Silver Mining & Milling Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, a mining corporation appealed a judgment of the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania, which held that a state license tax imposed on foreign corporations maintaining
offices within the state did not violate the Commerce Clause or the Privileges and Immuni-
ties Clause. 125 U.S. 181, 184, 187 (1888). The Court held that while the corporation was
not a citizen under Article TV's Privileges and Immunities Clause, it was a person for the
purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 187-89.
291. 169 U.S. 466 (1898).
292. Id. at 522.
293. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
294. Id. at 46.
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violating the statute challenged his conviction on the grounds that the
statute violated equal protection as well as his liberty interest under
the Due Process Clause.29 5
Justice Peckham, writing for the majority, held that the state legis-
lature exceeded its police power authority in enacting a statute limit-
ing the hours of employment for bakery employees. 296 He reasoned
that the "right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty of the individual protected by the Fourteenth Amendment
of the Federal Constitution. "297 Justice Holmes dissented, arguing
that "a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic
theory."298 Justice Holmes contended that the majority was simply in-
vesting the Due Process Clause with an ideological predisposition to
such a theory.299
In the first decades of the twentieth century, the Court employed
its conservative theory of economic liberties to strike down numerous
state and federal regulations."' The Lochner Court's expansive read-
ing of the Due Process Clause armed corporate attorneys with the
power to reduce state regulation to a semi-comatose state. The dis-
credited era of Lochnerism was ended by the sociolegal upheaval of
the Great Depression:
In the 1930s, economic pressures from the Depression, polit-
ical opposition by the Roosevelt Administration, and intellec-
tual assaults by the Legal Realists highlighted the anti-
majoritarian character of judicial review. The Supreme
Court's invalidation of popular New Deal legislation made it
especially vulnerable to such criticisms. By the late 1930s,
the newJustices had to define a role for the judiciary that did
not offend their earlier criticisms of the Lochner era Court.
This was not simply a matter of appearance or strategy; a
strong consensus existed that the previous Court had acted
improperly in striking down needed social and economic
legislation. In fact, since the mid-1930s, discussions about
constitutional law have been dominated by a desire to devise
295. Id. at 47, 59.
296. Id. at 58.
297. Id. at 53.
298. Id. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
299. Id. (Holmes, J., dissenting).
300. See, e.g., Weaver v. Palmer Bros. Co., 270 U.S. 402 (1926); Adkins v. Children's
Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States,
208 U.S. 161 (1908).
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a role for the Supreme Court that avoids the evils of
Lochnerism.3 °'
Justice Scalia was one to compare the Rehnquist Court's punitive
damages jurisprudence to Lochnerism. He noted that during the
Lochner era the Court suddenly discovered the Due Process Clause to
be a "secret repository of all sorts of other, unenumerated, substantive
rights."3 ° The Due Process Clause is subject to judicial activism pre-
cisely because it "can never be . . . precisely defined. '[U]nlike some
legal rules ... [it] is not a technical conception with a fixed content
unrelated to time, place and circumstances.' 3 0 3 Just as the Due Pro-
cess Clause "is not intended to embody a particular economic the-
ory,"3" 4 it should not be used to require the states to adopt a particular
theory of punitive damages.
D. Early Due Process Challenges to Punitive Damages
During the Lochner period, substantive due process was success-
fully used to strike down state regulations, but never to reverse puni-
tive damages awards. Corporate attorneys mounted early due process
challenges to the imposition of punitive damages.30 5 Hugo Black,
later to become a legendary U.S. Supreme Court Justice, made a sub-
stantive due process argument to defend a corporate defendant in
Louis Pizitz Dry Goods Co., Inc. v. Yeldell.3°6 In Yeldell, a jury awarded
$9,500 under Alabama's wrongful death statute, which permitted pu-
301. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword: The Vanishing Constitu-
tion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43, 63 (1989) (footnotes omitted).
302. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 470 (1993) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (comparing the suggestion that punitive damages defendants had an unenumer-
ated substantive due process right under the Fourteenth Amendment to reasonable
punitive damages to the economic liberty cases decided after Lochner); see also Thomas M.
Melsheimer & Steven H. Stodghill, Due Process and Punitive Damages: Providing Meaningful
Guidance to the Jury, 47 SMU L. REv. 329, 336 (1994) (noting that "substantive limits on
[punitive damages] awards are... reminiscent of the Court's jurisprudence in the Lochner
era").
303. Lassiter v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981) (quoting Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961)).
304. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
305. In a minority of jurisdictions, individual plaintiffs successfully argued that the im-
position of punitive damages after a criminal prosecution violated the constitutional prohi-
bition against doublejeopardy. Sce, e.g., Huber v. Teuber, 10 D.C. (3 MacArth.) 484 (1879)
(holding that punitive damages could not be imposed for an aggravated assault partly be-
cause the defendant could also be punished criminally); Taber v. Hutson, 5 Ind. 322, 325
(1854) (holding that the defendant would be placed in double jeopardy if subject to the
imposition of both civil and criminal punishment); Borkenstein v. Schrack, 67 N.E. 47
(Ind. App. 1903) (holding that exemplary damages could not be recovered under the torts
of assault and battery because the defendant was subject to criminal prosecution).
306. 274 U.S. 112 (1927).
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nitive damages to be recovered. °v The basis of the claim against the
dry goods store was that it was negligent in failing to maintain a store
elevator whose defect led to the death of a customer.308 Arguing that
vicarious punitive liability violated his corporate client's due process
rights and anticipating late-twentieth-century arguments, Black rea-
soned that it was unfair to punish the company for the actions of em-
ployees. 30 9 He contended that vicarious liability for punitive damages
violated a company's Fourteenth Amendment rights.310 The U.S. Su-
preme Court upheld the statute. The Court found that the statute was
passed for the purpose of preventing death by wrongful act or omis-
sion, and therefore did not unconstitutionally deprive the employer of
property without due process of law. 311 The Court concluded that vi-
carious punitive liability was not "so novel in the law or so shocking 'to
reason or to conscience' as to afford in itself any ground for the con-
tention that it denies due process of law."31 Today this well-estab-
lished remedy has been federalized by the U.S. Supreme Court.
E. The Rehnquist Court's Constitutionalization of Punitive Damages
In Washington v. GlucksburgF'3 Chief Justice Rehnquist outlined
the two aspects of substantive due process analysis: "First, we have reg-
ularly observed that the Due Process Clause specially protects those
fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, 'deeply rooted
in this Nation's history and tradition.' . . . Second, we have required
in substantive-due-process cases a 'careful description' of the asserted
fundamental liberty interest. "314 Chief Justice Rehnquist described
substantive due process protections as encompassing those specific
freedoms enumerated by the Bill of Rights and the liberty interest spe-
cially protected by the Due Process Clause, which encompasses the
rights to marry, to have children, to direct the education and upbring-
ing of one's children, to marital privacy, to use contraception, to bod-
ily integrity, to abortion, and to the right to refuse medical
treatment.
315
307. Id. at 113-14.
308. Id. at 113.
309. Alabama's wrongful death statute permitted wide discretion on the part of the jury:
"This statute authorizes the recovery of damages from either a principal or an agent, in
such amount as the jury may assess, for wrongful act or negligence causing death." Id at
113.
310. Id. at 114.
311. Id at 116.
312. Id.
313. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
314. Id. at 720-21 (citations omitted).
315. Id. at 720.
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Corporate freedom from excessive punitive damages is not in-
cluded in Chief Justice Rehnquist's list of substantive due process
rights. In each of the cases challenging the constitutionality of puni-
tive damages, representatives of corporate America have not only
been "Friends of the Court," but highly partisan "Lobbyists of the
Court. '3 16 Hundreds of amicus briefs were filed by habitual corporate
defendants in the punitive damages constitutional cases. 17 Every con-
ceivable sector of the business, the media, and the insurance indus-
tries has signed on to briefs urging the Court to intervene in state law.
The corporate community first joined forces in an organized fashion
in their amicus briefs in Browning-Ferris Industries Inc. v. Kelco Disposal
Inc."' In Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Haslip, twenty-five amicus
briefs supported the petitioner.31 9 In each punitive damages case,
amici submitted briefs arguing that judicial tort reform was required
to deal with the explosion of punitive damages claims.32 °
The anti-punitive damages corporate briefs dismiss the well-estab-
lished body of empirical work confirming that there is no punitive
damages crisis warranting judicial intervention. The corporate briefs
eschew empirical evidence about real-world punitive damages, prefer-
ring ginned-up 'junk social science" and studies prepared for litiga-
tion to build their case for radical judicial surgery.32 1 The Court has
been predisposed to accept hyperbolic assertions about the punitive
damages crisis because the judiciary has been targeted for "reeduca-
tion" about punitive damages.322 Corporate groups sponsor seminars
in which the goal is to reeducate the judiciary about the defects of our
civil justice system.32 3 Finally, members of the Supreme Court are not
only exposed to anti-punitives discourse in amicus briefs, but these
themes are echoed in a larger cultural war against punitive damages.
Tort reform advocacy organizations such as the Heritage Foundation
are on a mission to reshape judicial consciousness about punitive
316. See Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 121-22.
317. See, e.g., id. at 122-31.
318. 492 U.S. 257 (1989); Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 125-26
& n.156 (documenting that sixteen amicus curiae briefs signed by a who's who of Ameri-
can industry were filed in support of the petitioner's view that the punitive damages award
in that case was an excessive fine violating the Eighth Amendment).
319. 499 U.S. 1 (1991); Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 126 &
n.159.
320. Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 126-27.
321. Id. at 127-28.
322. Id. at 141.
323. Id. at 141 n.248 (noting how tort reformers sponsor tort reeducation programs for
judges as well as the general public).
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damages.324 Richard Willard, an avowed tort reformer, acknowledged
the goal of judicial reeducation:
We also need to change the attitudes of our courts. Activist
judges, not legislatures, have made most of the changes in
tort law doctrine that have produced the liability crisis....
Judges and juries must recognize that civil damage awards
are not a free lunch. 25
More recently, Exxon funded studies, performed by academics
and cited extensively in State Farm's principal brief as well as numer-
ous amicus briefs supporting the defendant insurance company in the
Campbell case.3 26 The empirical research funded by Exxon has already
been useful in other excessiveness challenges. 27 In November of
2003, a Montgomery, Alabama jury handed down $11.8 billion in pu-
nitive damages and $63.6 million in compensatory damages against
Exxon/Mobil in a royalties dispute over payments for oil field
leases. 328 In this high-ratio case, the State of Alabama was awarded the
second largest punitive damages award to a single plaintiff in his-
tory.329 This case has the potential of reviving constitutional chal-
lenges based upon the Eighth Amendment's excessive fines clause
given that the plaintiff is the State of Alabama.33° Justices of the U.S.
324. Id, at 141.
325. Richard K. Willard, Wheel of Fortune: Stopping Outrageous and Arbitrary Liability Ver-
dicts, POL'Y REV., Spring 1986, at 40, 43.
326. See Alan Zarembo, Studies to Suit Need, L.A. TiMES, Dec. 3, 2003, at Al ("In a separate
U.S. Supreme Court case involving State Farm Insurance, leading corporations filed a brief
that repeatedly cited Exxon-funded research. The plaintiffs, backed by 21 academics,
countered with a lengthy attack on the studies.").
327. Id.
328. See Dee McAree, Punitives War Has New Battleground; Exxon Loses a Huge Verdict in
Alabama, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 24, 2003, at 1 (discussing Alabama v. Exxon Corp., CV-99-2368
(Ala. Cir. Ct. Nov. 14, 2003)).
329. Id. Speaking about this case, Andrew Frey, lead counsel for the corporate defen-
dant in BMW v. Gore, argued that a "case with $63 million in compensatory damages that is
a fight between a state and big business, where it is at least arguable whether there should
be punitives or not, does not seem to me to have the ingredients to justify a high punitive
ratio." Id. at 15.
On post-trial motions the court remitted the punitive award to $3.5 billion, found that
the true ratio of punitives to compensatory damages was only 3.75:1 because the total harm
caused by the defendants was $930 million, and concluded that the award was constitu-
tional. See Laura Clark Fey et al., The Supreme Court Raised Its Voice: Are the Lower Courts
Getting the Message? Punitive Damages Trends After State Farm v. Campbell, 56 BAYLOR L. Ray.
807, 837 (2004).
330. In several of the punitive damages cases before the Court, the amici cited empirical
research funded and produced in-house by Texaco. Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion,
supra note 227, at 144. Texaco was assessed the largest punitive damages award other than
the Exxon case in the famous Pennzoil case. See Texaco, Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 784 F.2d
1133, 1136 (2d Cir. 1986), rev'd, 481 U.S. 1 (1987). The Texaco punitive damages study
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Supreme Court are not immune from the human tendency to draw
questionable normative arguments from distorted data. The Court
has begun to unmake the state law of punitive damages as a response
to the widespread perception that punitive damages are out of control
in the business community.
1. BMW v. Gore.-By 1991 the Court had upheld a large puni-
tive award with the cautionary observation that the high-ratio award
was "close to the line" of constitutional propriety.331 In 1993, the
Court upheld the constitutionality of punitive damages in a business
torts case in which scores of corporate amici urged the Court to give
the defendant relief from excessive punitive damages.332 A year later
the Court reversed a large punitive damages award in a products lia-
bility case by ruling that the defendant's procedural due process rights
were violated by an amendment to Oregon's state constitution that
precluded post-trial reviews for excessiveness.
distorted data by reporting mean punitive awards versus medians, the use of percentages
without reporting absolute numbers, and failing to disaggregate data. Rustad & Koenig,
Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 143-48. The Texaco Study was published by the Wash-
ington Legal Foundation, another anti-punitive damages amici, and distributed widely by a
third amicus filing organization, the American Tort Reform Association; it was widely cited
by amici supporting the petitioner in TXO. Id. at 144.
331. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 23 (1991). In Haslip, for the first
time in history the Court considered the question of whether a high-ratio punitive damages
award violated substantive due process. Haslip arose out of a bad faith insurance settle-
ment case, in which a dishonest insurance agent pocketed his clients' premiums rather
than sending them to Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company, and he concealed from his
customers the fact that his dishonesty had caused their policies to lapse. Id. at 5. Cleopatra
Haslip, the principal plaintiff, learned of the agent's malfeasance only after her hospital
bill was rejected by the insurance company. Id. After unsuccessfully attempting to resolve
the matter, she and her co-employees sued both the dishonest agent and Pacific Mutual.
Id. at 5-6. The jury returned a general verdict of $1,040,000 for Haslip, which included a
compensatory damages award of $200,000, with out-of-pocket expenditures of less than
$4,000. Id. at 7 & n.2. As in Browning-Ferris, numerous business groups filed amicus briefs
claiming that punitive damages were out of control and required judicial intervention by
the Court to restore the balance. For a complete list of amicus brief signatories on behalf
of Pacific Mutual, see Rustad & Koenig, Selective Distortion, supra note 227, at 126-27 &
n. 160.
332. TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993). In TXO, Justice
O'Connor's dissent, joined by Justice White in full and Justice Souter in part, reiterated
her concern that excessive awards against out-of-state corporations were unfairly "transfer-
ring money from 'wealthy' corporations to comparatively needier plaintiffs." Id. at 491
(O'Connor, J., dissenting). In TXO, aiici represented many sectors of "the nation's busi-
ness community-from Allstate Insurance Co. to the Monsanto Co.-[which] argue[d]
that [punitive damages] . . . continue to run wild, and there is a need for specific stan-
dards." Marcia Coyle, Punitives at Issue, Yet Again, Justices Examine Either "Mirage" or "Crisis",
NAT'L LJ., Mar. 29, 1993, at 1.
333. Honda Motor Co., Ltd. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415 (1994).
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At common law, of course, punitive damages could be reduced or
reversed on evidentiary errors, juror bias, or passion or prejudice, but
never, until 1996, on the grounds that the size of an award alone vio-
lated a defendant's due process rights. 34 Core federalist principles
encourage the states to experiment with normative as well as procedu-
ral reforms of tort law. The states are achieving a mounting consensus
entirely within the tradition of federalism that punitive damages need
to be tailored to local conditions. Yet, with the reversal of awards on
due process grounds, the Court's punitive damages jurisprudence
reveals a certain suspicion about the states' ability to protect the sub-
stantive rights of corporate persons.3 35
In BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore, a 5-4 majority found a $2
million punitive damages award to be excessive and violative of the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.3 6  The Gore
Court paid homage to federalist principles in acknowledging that
"[s]tates necessarily have considerable flexibility in determining the
level of punitive damages that they will allow in different classes of
cases and in any particular case." 33 7 The Court also stated that "legis-
lative judgments concerning appropriate sanctions for the conduct at
issue" are entitled to "substantial deference. '3 8 The Court then pro-
ceeded to violate those federalist principles by substituting its concept
of punitive damages for more than two centuries of state law develop-
ment. 3 9 The Court supplanted state law procedures and evidentiary
rules with an entirely new federal constitutional framework.3 4  The
Court announced three guideposts to determine whether exemplary
damages are disproportionate to compensatory damages: (1) "the de-
gree of reprehensibility of the nondisclosure;" (2) "the disparity be-
tween the harm or potential harm . . . and [the] punitive damages
award;" and (3) "the difference between [the] remedy and the civil
penalties authorized or imposed in comparable cases. "341 Justice
334. SeeJane Massey Draper, Annotation, Excessiveness or Inadequacy of Punitive Damages in
Cases Not Involving Personal Injury or Death, 14 A.L.R.5th 242 (1993) (collecting and examin-
ing state and federal cases in which courts reviewed punitive damages for excessiveness or
inadequacy).
335. See TVT Records v. Island Def Jam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 417-18
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (citing, for example, Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Haslip).
336. 517 U.S. 559, 562-63 (1996).
337. Id. at 568.
338. Id. at 583 (quoting Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S.
257, 301 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
339. Id. at 599 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
340. Id. at 614-19 (appendix to opinion of Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (listing the states'
prior legislative activity with respect to placing limits on punitive damages).
341. Id. at 575.
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Scalia, however, criticized these guideposts as "mark[ing] a road to
nowhere; they provide no real guidance at all." 42 Justice Ginsburg
further observed that "[t]he Court's readiness to superintend state-
court punitive damages awards is all the more puzzling in view of the
Court's longstanding reluctance to countenance review, even by
courts of appeals, of the size of verdicts returned by juries in federal
district court proceedings."343
2. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v. Campbell.-
The Court's latest stop on the "road to nowhere" occurred in April of
2003, when it decided State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. v.
Campbell and struck down a $145 million punitive damages award on
the grounds that the award was so excessive as to violate the insurer's
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.344 The case arose from a coverage dispute between State Farm
and its insured, Curtis Campbell, who was the defendant in a wrongful
death action stemming from an auto accident.345 State Farm made a
decision to contest Campbell's liability in the wrongful death action,
and declined to settle all claims against Campbell for the limits of his
insurance policy.3 146 State Farm also ignored the advice of one of its
own investigators and, taking the case to trial, assured the Campbell
family that "their assets were safe, that they had no liability for the
accident, that [State Farm] would represent their interests, and that
they did not need to procure separate counsel."347 The Campbells
faced financial ruin resulting from State Farm's decision; the jury re-
turned a judgment for $185,849, "far more than the amount offered
342. Id. at 605 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia's concern was that the federal guide-
posts not only supplanted well-established state law, but would cause confusion in the
states:
The legal significance of these "guideposts" is nowhere explored, but their neces-
sary effect is to establish federal standards governing the hitherto exclusively state
law of damages. Apparently (though it is by no means clear) all three federal
.guideposts" can be overridden if "necessary to deter future misconduct,"-a
loophole that will encourage state reviewing courts to uphold awards as necessary
for the "adequat[e] protect[ion]" of state consumers. By effectively requiring
state reviewing courts to concoct rationalizations-whether within the "guide-
posts" or through the loophole-to justify the intuitive punitive reactions of state
juries, the Court accords neither category of institution the respect it deserves.
Of course it will not be easy for the States to comply with this new federal law of damages,
no matter how willing they are to do so.
343. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (alterations in original).
Id. at 613 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
344. 538 U.S. 408 (2003).
345. Id. at 412-13.
346. Id. at 413.
347. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1142 (Utah 2001).
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in settlement."348 State Farm not only refused to cover the damages in
excess of the policy limits, but their counsel refused to post a bond
allowing the Campbells to appeal this judgment. 4 ' He advised them
instead that they should place "for sale" signs on their property to
satisfy the judgment, or afford the appeal. 35" The Campbells then
filed suit against State Farm for its bad faith settlement practices. 51
At trial, the plaintiffs contended that State Farm should be pun-
ished for its national policy to cap claim payments and for fraudulent
settlement practices.3 152 The Campbells were awarded $2.6 million in
compensatory damages and $145 million in punitive damages.35 3 The
trial court reduced the compensatory award to $1 million and the
punitives award to $25 million. 54 On appeal, the Utah Supreme
Court reinstated the entire punitive damages award after applying the
Gore guideposts. 55 The Utah Supreme Court examined the record,
and found State Farm's conduct to be reprehensible as shown by evi-
dence of its fraudulent business practices, its wealth, and its clandes-
tine activities that made it likely that it would only be caught in "one
out of every 50,000 cases as a matter of statistical probability. '356 The
Utah Supreme Court uncovered overwhelming evidence that State
Farm systematically targeted economically vulnerable policyholders to
pad its bottom line.357 The court also found systematic evidence of
State Farm's national policy decision to deliberately cheat or short-
change its customers.358
The U.S. Supreme Court granted the defendant's writ of certio-
rari. 35' The Court, in a 6-3 decision, reversed the judgment of the
Utah Supreme Court, and held that the high-ratio punitive damages
award violated the defendant's substantive due process rights. 60 The
Court acknowledged that there were sufficient grounds for punitive
damages given the trial court's finding "that State Farm's employees
altered the company's records to make Campbell appear less culpa-
348. Campbell I, 538 U.S. at 413.
349. Id.
350. Id.
351. Id. at 413-14.
352. Id. at 414-15.
353. Id. at 415.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d 1134, 1153 (Utah 2001).
357. See id at 1148 (citing evidence of the insurer's systematic pattern of unfair settle-
ment practices targeting vulnerable policyholders, such as the poor and the elderly).
358. See id. (describing the series of tactics used by State Farm to defraud customers).
359. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 416.
360. Id. at 429.
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ble."36 ' Another aggravating circumstance was the insurer's disregard
of "the overwhelming likelihood of liability and the near-certain
probability that, by taking the case to trial, ajudgment in excess of the
policy limits would be awarded. '3 62 The Court acknowledged that it
was appropriate for the jury to punish State Farm, but found that the
$145 million punitive damages award went beyond the state's legiti-
mate objectives in punishing and deterring the insurer for its repre-
hensible conduct.16' The Court second-guessed the Utah Supreme
Court, stating that a "more modest punishment for this reprehensible
conduct could have satisfied the State's legitimate objectives." '64
The Court's single-minded view of retribution undermines state
sovereignty and misreads the multiple functions of punitive damages
as they have evolved over two centuries of Anglo-American jurispru-
dence.365 The Court has imposed a highly restrictive framework in its
analysis of retributory punishment. To determine whether the defen-
dant's conduct is reprehensible, the Court must ask whether: (1) "the
harm caused was physical as opposed to economic"; (2) "the tortious
conduct evinced an indifference to or a reckless disregard of the
health or safety of others"; (3) "the target of the conduct had financial
vulnerability"; (4) "the conduct involved repeated actions or was an
isolated incident"; and (5) "the harm was the result of intentional mal-
ice, trickery, or deceit, or mere accident."366 The Court also seems to
require more than one of these factors to be present: "the existence of
any one of these factors weighing in favor of a plaintiff may not be
sufficient to sustain a punitive damages award; and the absence of all
of them renders any award suspect. "367
In Campbell II, the Court criticized not only the size of the puni-
tive damages award levied against State Farm, but also the trial court's
evidentiary rulings as to State Farm's national policies. 6 ' The Court
castigated the lower court for permitting the trial lawyer to use evi-
dence of punitive damages "as a platform to expose, and punish, the
perceived deficiencies of State Farm's operations throughout the
country. '369 The Court failed to consider that it is critical to the func-
361. Id. at 419.
362. Id.
363. Id at 423-24.
364. Id. at 419-20.
365. See, e.g., id. at 425 (stating that the Court's holding defers to state goals, but then
proceeding to dismantle state law).
366. Id. at 419.
367. Id.
368. Id. at 420-21.
369. Id.
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tion of deterrence that the insurer, and others not before the court,
be admonished about the dire consequences of implementing a na-
tional policy that shortchanges policyholders.370
The Court also formulated a test for reviewing the reasonableness
of high-ratio punitive damage awards: "Single-digit multipliers are
more likely to comport with due process, while still achieving the
State's goals of deterrence and retribution, than awards with ratios in
range of 500 to 1, or in this case, of 145 to 1. "1371 Justice Kennedy,
writing for the majority, observed that "few awards exceeding a single-
digit ratio between punitive and compensatory damages.., will satisfy
due process."37' The Campbell II Court also created a questionable
presumption that compensatory damages also contain a punitive com-
ponent. The Court cited no empirical findings supporting its observa-
tion that where compensatory damages compensate for emotional
distress, "such as humiliation or indignation aroused by the defen-
dant's act, there is no clear line of demarcation between punishment
and compensation.
3 1 73
The punitive damages in Campbell II were ruled an arbitrary and
unconstitutional deprivation because the insurer's conduct failed
both the reprehensibility and the high-ratio tests. 3 74 However, the
Court eschewed a mathematical ratio test: "The precise award in any
case, of course, must be based upon the facts and circumstances of the
defendant's conduct and the harm to the plaintiff."3 75 Thus, one net
effect of the Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence is to re-
place communitarian principles of punitive damages developed over
centuries with an individualistic retributive model predicated upon lex
taloni. 37
6
Finally, the Court in Campbell II limited the type of evidence that
may be used to show that punitive damages are appropriate and the
manner in which states may determine what is punishment enough to
deter the defendant and others from repeating their misconduct.
370. See, e.g., City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 266-67 (1981) (noting
that one purpose of punitive damages is to deter persons other than the defendant from
engaging in wrongful activities).
371. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 425 (citations omitted).
372. Id.
373. Id. at 426 (quoting RESTATEMENr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. c (1979)).
374. Id. at 425.
375. Id.
376. See Davida A. Williams, Note, Punishing the Faithful: Freud, Religion, and the Law, 24
CARDozo L. REv. 2181, 2201 (2003) ("Another concept associated with the retributivist
philosophy is the concept of lex talonis, the idea of exact retaliation or proportionality.
Accordingly, punishment must be in the exact degree of the crime, neither too harsh nor
too lax; otherwise moral equilibrium will not be restored." (footnote omitted)).
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With calls to increase these limitations continuing, there will be no
shortage of future issues for the Court to ponder when it comes to
punitive damages. In Campbell II, for example, corporate amici urged
the Court to eliminate the variable of the defendant's wealth from the
punitive damages equation.3 77 While the Court in Campbell II did not
accept that argument, it did express its disfavor with using wealth as a
3781factor in calculating damages., One wonders if that may be the nextlimitation the Court places on punitive damages.
3. Post-Campbell II Remand Orders.-In 2003, the business com-
munity ranked the Court's decision in Campbell II as the single most
important decision of the year for corporate America. 79 The insur-
ance industry and product manufacturers were the chief financial
beneficiaries of the Court's nationalization of punitive damages, as
the Court granted certiorari in many cases for the sole purpose of
remanding to state courts for reconsideration in light of Campbell H." °
In Campbell Ii's wake, punitive damages awards against a who's who of
corporate defendants have been vacated: Philip Morris, Exxon,
Chrysler, Ford Motor Company, and National Union Fire Insur-
ance. 38 ' For example, the $5 billion punitive damages award in the
Exxon Valdez oil spill disaster was vacated,38 2 as was a $290 million
377. Brief of the American Tort Reform Association as Amicus Curiae in Support of
Petitioner at 28, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. Inc. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408 (2003) (No.
01-1289).
378. Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 427.
379. E.g., Marcia Coyle, Business Cases Cut Wide Swath; So Far, 18 of the 38 Cases on the
Docket Could Impact Employers, NAT'L LJ., Sept. 29, 2003, at 8.
380. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Textron Fin. Corp., 538 U.S. 974 (2003) (vacat-
ing a punitive damages award in an insurance bad faith case and remanding for reconsid-
eration in light of Campbell I1); Anchor Hocking, Inc. v. Waddill, 538 U.S. 974 (2003)
(vacating a punitive damages award in a products liability action and remanding for recon-
sideration in light of Campbell 11).
381. It should come as no surprise that State Farm and several of the corporate defend-
ants who had their punitive damages verdicts vacated are financial supporters of the tort
reform movement. See Trisha L. Howard, Lawyers Strike Back at Interest Groups; They Say the
Groups Who Have Criticized Donations to Judges Promote Corporate, Not Public Interests, ST. Louis
POST-DISPATCH, Oct. 11, 2002, at Cl (noting that the American Tort Reform Association
counts as its primary supporters such companies as Caterpillar, Exxon, General Electric,
Philip Morris and State Farm Insurance").
382. Sea Hawk Seafoods, Inc. v. Exxon Corp., No. 30-35166, No. 03-32519, 2003 U.S.
App. LEXIS 18219 (9th Cir. Aug. 18, 2003), vacating and remanding In re Exxon Valdez, 236
F. Supp. 2d 1043 (D. Alaska 2002); seeJoseph J. Chambers, In re Exxon Valdez: Application
of Due Process Constraints on Punitive Damages Awards, 20 AiAsKA L. REV. 195, 198 (2003)
("On August 18, 2003, before the parties even submitted appellate briefs, the Ninth Circuit
vacated the district court's judgment and remanded the case so that the district court
could reconsider its decision in light of State Farm Automobile Insurance Company v. Campbell,
decided by the Supreme Court in April of 2003.").
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award against Ford Motor Company383 and a $3 million punitive dam-
ages award against Chrysler Corporation.384 Phillip Morris received
what was, in effect, a multimillion dollar gift from the Court's vacating
of a $79.5 million punitive damages award against the tobacco giant in
the wake of Campbell II. 85 Punitive damages have been slashed by
state courts in nearly every case on remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court, and, interestingly, many of the corporate defendants whose pu-
nitive damages were vacated are underwriters of tort reform in Con-
gress and state legislatures.
38 6
The Court's constitutional theory of punitive damages is another
example of how corporate America is successful in the "politics of rec-
ognition."387 The corporate community's continual barrage of anti-
punitive damages rhetoric is correlated with the nationalization of pu-
nitive damages. The next Part examines the specific ways that the
Court's individual retributory model interferes with the multiple so-
cial functions of punitive damages that have evolved over two centu-
ries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
III. THE MULTIPLE AND LATENT FUNCTIONS OF PUNITIVE DAMAGES
We must not make a scarecrow of the law,
Setting it up to fear the birds of prey,
And let it keep one shape till custom make it
Their perch and not their terror.388
383. Ford Motor Co. v. Romo, 538 U.S. 1028 (2003), vacating and remanding 122 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 139 (Ct. App. 2002).
384. Chrysler Corp. v. Clark, 540 U.S. 801 (2003), vacating and remanding 310 F.3d 461
(6th Cir. 2002).
385. Philip Morris USA v. Williams, 540 U.S. 801 (2003), vacating and remanding 51 P.3d
670 (Or. Ct. App. 2002). On remand, the Oregon Court of Appeals reinstated the award.
92 P.3d 126 (Or. Ct. App. 2004). The Supreme Court of Oregon has since decided to
review the case. 104 P.3d 601 (Or. 2004).
386. See supra note 381.
387. Victor Schwartz, counsel for the American Tort Reform Association and senior edi-
tor of the Prosser casebook, claims that "American business faces a world of unended,
unbounded threat of punitive damages." Stephen Wermiel, Fit Punishment? High Court Will
Get Chance to Put Limits on Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Sept. 28, 1990, at Al. Monsanto's
Richard Mahoney claims that "[t] he punitive-damages system makes it too easy for lawyers
to persuade ajury-possessing little scientific background but believing in the possibility of
a risk-free society-to enrich plaintiffs and contingent-fee lawyers with multimillion-dollar
windfalls." RichardJ. Mahoney, Business Forum; Punitive Damages; It's Time to Curb the Courts,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 1988, at 3; see also Theodore B. Olson, Rule of Law: The Dangerous
National Sport of Punitive Damages, WALL ST. J., Oct. 5, 1994, at Al 7 (criticizing the system of
punitive damages in the context of the Exxon Valdez case).
388. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE, act 2, sc. 1, 11.1-4, at 32 (Grace lop-
polo ed., Applause 2001) (1623).
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In the 2003 term, the Supreme Court willingly gave State Farm
relief from its punitive damages liability, but it rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to a draconian criminal sentence in Lockyer v. An-
drade."9 The defendant in that case stole five videotapes, worth a
total of $84.70, from a K-Mart in Ontario, California.39 ° Two weeks
later he stole videotapes worth $68.84 from another K-Mart in Mont-
clair, California.39 Andrade was charged with petty theft for shoplift-
ing $150 worth of videotapes, but because he had prior convictions,
the charge was prosecuted as a felony.392
Andrade was sentenced to two consecutive terms of a twenty-five-
year sentence for the petty thievery; California's three strikes law pro-
vides that "any felony can constitute the third strike, and thus can sub-
ject a defendant to a term of 25 years to life."393 The defendant's
prior crimes were possession of marijuana and relatively minor theft
offenses.19 4 The Court, in a 5-4 decision upholding the three strikes
law, was unmoved by the argument that the imposition of two twenty-
five-year prison terms for stealing $150 worth of videotapes was grossly
disproportionate to the offense. 95
The Andrade Court ruled that the gross disproportionality princi-
ple of federal constitutional law applies only to extraordinary cases
and that it was not an unreasonable application of law to affirm An-
drade's sentence.396 Justice Souter's dissent stated that "the Eighth
Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment to
terms of years is articulated in the 'clearly established' principle ac-
knowledged by the Court: a sentence grossly disproportionate to the
offense for which it is imposed is unconstitutional."397 In Campbell II,
the Court held that the corporate coffers must be protected against
excessive civil judgments, but the Court in Andrade refused to overturn
two twenty-five-year sentences for a petty criminal.39
389. 538 U.S. 63 (2003).
390. Id. at 66.
391. Id.
392. Id. at 67.
393. Id.
394. Id at 66-67.
395. Id. at 77.
396. Id.
397. Id. at 77 (Souter, J., dissenting).
398. The Court's upholding of this draconian criminal sentence might have even vio-
lated Article 3 of the European Convention of Human Rights, as well as Article 5 of the
United Nations Declaration of Human Rights. Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (as amended by Protocol No. 11) (1988), available at
http://www.echr.coe.int/Convention/WebConvenENG.pdf; Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, art. 5, G.A. Res. 217 A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/311 (1948); see
also Recent Case, 114 Harv. L. Rev. 648, 652 n.38 (2000) (noting the international trend
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During each October Term, the Court is flooded with petitions
from corporate wrongdoers seeking relief from punitive damages.
99
The United States Supreme Court receives over seven thousand peti-
tions for certiorari per year and accepts fewer than one hundred.
4
"'
Much of the Court's docket each year is comprised of cases involving
criminal procedure, general business law, and challenges to new fed-
eral regulations.41  Given how few cases the Court decides, it is strik-
ing that the Court has decided seven cases on the constitutionality of
the state law remedy of punitive damages in a decade and a half. The
Court's recent punitive damages jurisprudence is particularly surpris-
ing given the appreciation that the Court has for the balance between
state and federal government in the other subject areas of its
docket.40 2 Corporate due process under tort law has won its place on
the Court's docket alongside cases considering the rights of natural
persons in such high-profile issues as the death penalty, abortion,
school prayer, and rights of criminal defendants. A leading first-year
casebook in constitutional law observes that the Court's punitive dam-
ages decisions have "revived substantive due process in the area of ec-
onomic liberty."4°3 Today's law students are learning about corporate
due process rights in punitive damages litigation alongside cases such
as Griswold v. Connecticut'4 and Roe v. Wade.
4 0 5 The constitutionaliza-
tion of punitive damages is an unprecedented project to convince the
Court to "unmake" the tort law remedy of punitive damages."
6 In the
towards recognition of lengthy incarceration on death row as cruel and excessive 
punish-
ment). Yet, the Court was content to defer to the state's expansive view of criminal
punishment.
399. Historically, the Court was reluctant to read the Due Process Clause very 
broadly.
Many have argued, however, that the Due Process Clause be viewed "as a means 
of bringing
to the test of the decision of [the Supreme Court] the abstract opinions of every unsuccess-
ful litigant in a State court, of the justice of the decision against him." Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Humes, 115 U.S. 512, 520 (1885) (quoting Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U.S. 97, 104
(1877)).
400. SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR, THE MAJESTY OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS OF A SUPREME
COURTJUSTICE 11 (2003).
401. Id at 11-13.
402. For example, Justice O'Connor comments how the Rehnquist Court has "given 
a
more expansive interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, and that in turn 
has produced
more cases in that area." Id at 13.
403. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 478 (14th ed.
2001).
404. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
405. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
406. See generally Stephen D. Sugarman, Judges as Tort Law Un-Makers: Recent California
Experience with 'New' Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 455 (1999) (arguing that the California Su-
preme Court has served to "unmake" tort law in such diverse areas as products 
liability,
liability for third-party misbehavior, and the negligent infliction of emotional distress).
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1960s, the Court was a "tort unmaker 4 °7 of state law for information-
based torts.4 °8 The Court's undue emphasis on individual harm is
reminiscent of AT&T's advertising slogan of "Reach Out and Touch
Someone." After Campbell II, the U.S. Supreme Court requires plain-
tiffs to prove a nexus between certain aspects of a company's aggra-
vated misconduct and the plaintiffs' specific injury.4 09 In Campbell II,
the Court ruled that an insurer's lawful, out-of-state conduct could
only be considered in assessing punitive damages if such misconducthad a "nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."'" The
Court's punitive damages jurisprudence tacitly assumes that interna-
tional corporations reach out to harm specific plaintiffs rather thanimplement broad policies that harm diffuse groups of individuals.
The Court's myopic preoccupation with individual retribution il-lustrates% the process I call 'judicial miniaturism," inspired by sociolo-gist John Stolte, who coined the term "sociological miniaturism" to
describe sociological social psychology, which is a form of microsoci-
ology.41' The Court's microanalysis of individual retributive justice
overlooks the macrosociological functions of punitive damages thathave evolved over two centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence.
Under the Campbell II Court's retributive punishment model, the in-quiry is solely on whether a tortfeasor is deserving of punishment and
whether the amount of the award is equal to the harm done to theindividual plaintiff rather than the impact on the larger society." 2
Sociologist Robert Merton's theory of manifest and latent func-
tions provides a useful heuristic device in explaining the multiple
functions of punitive damages.413 Manifest functions are those that
are intended and have recognizable consequences for the social sys-
tem, as compared to latent functions that are beneath the surface and
407. That history of "unmaking" state law and replacing it with newly made federal lawbegan before the 19 60s. See generally Andrew L. Kaufman, Benjamin Cardozo as ParadigmaticTort Lawmaker, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 281 (1999). Cardozo openly acknowledged and de-
fended the practice of judge-made law. Id. at 281-82.
408. E.g., N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (unmaking tort law by con-
structing the public official doctrine, which limited the state law tort of defamation).409. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 422 (2003).
410. Id.
411. Stolte et al., supra note 23, at 388; see also SPENCER E. CAHILL, INSIDE SOCIAL LIFE:
READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY & MICROSOCIOLOGY ix (3d ed. 2001) (noting that
microsociology focuses on "the daily details of how actual people create and sustain the
social relationships, organizations, and systems that macrosociology studies in the
abstract").
412. See Campbell 1I, 538 U.S. at 422-23 (noting how the lower court improperly awardedpunitive damages based upon harms unrelated to those suffered by the Campbells).413. See generally ROBERT K. MERTON, SOCIAL THEORY AND SOCIAL STRUCTURE (rev. ed.
1957).
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neither intended nor recognized by participants.414 In the context of
punitive damages, the manifest functions of punishment and deter-
rence are the avowed goals of the remedy.415 In contrast, the subgoals
are the latent functions that fulfill societal purposes often not recog-
nized or articulated in court opinions.416 This Part explores how the
Court's miniaturist view of punitive damages deflects attention away
from the broader societal goals and subgoals of tort law remedies first
identified by Calabresi in The Costs of Accidents. The Court's single-
minded preoccupation with retributory punishment has distracted it
from considering the broader social functions of punitive damages
first identified by Calabresi. As Calabresi would readily acknowledge,
confirmation hearings for U.S. Supreme Court justices or other fed-
eral judges do not address a nominee's knowledge or competence to
make or unmake the nuanced functions of punitive damages.
417
A. The Court's Miniaturization of Punitive Damages
The Campbell II Court focused entirely upon the individual-based
retributory goal of punishment in contrast to the broad societal func-
tions of punitive damages in the states. The Court is correct that retri-
bution was a key component in numerous primitive legal systems.
Retributory punishment was well established in the Babylonian Ham-
murabi Code.418 However, by the time of Twelve Tables, even Roman
414. Id at 51.
415. E.g., BMW of N. Am., Inc. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 568 (1996); Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co.
v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 21 (1991).
416. See MERTON, supra note 413, at 63 (describing "latent functions" as "unintended
and unrecognized consequences"); see also Loudon v. Ryder, 2 Q.B. 202, 209 (1953) (up-
holding £5,500 exemplary damages award and observing that a more subtle effect of the
award is to act as a fine designed "to hit the defendant hard if he has disregarded the rights
of others and show that that sort of conduct does not pay").
417. See Guido Calabresi, 21st Century Judging and Tort Law, Keynote Address to the
AALS Conference on Torts, The Judge's New Robe: Rethinking the Judicial Role for the
21st Century Torts (June 20, 2003) available at http://www.aals.org/profdev/torts/pro-
gram.html [hereinafter 21st Century Judging and Tort Law].
418. Charles F. Horne, The Avalon Project at Yale University, The Code of Hammurabi:
Introduction, at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/medieval/hammint.htm (last modi-
fied Feb. 22, 2005). Hammurabi "was the ruler who chiefly established the greatness of
Babylon, the world's first metropolis. Many relics of Hammurabi's reign ([1795-1750 BC])
have been preserved, and today we can study this remarkable King ... as a wise law-giver in
his celebrated code . . . ." Id. (alternations in original). Multiple fines calibrated to the
enormity of the offense were integral to the Hammurabi Code:
The commonest of all penalties was a fine. This is awarded by the Code for corpo-
ral injuries to a muskinu or slave (paid to his master); for damages done to prop-
erty, for breach of contract. The restoration of goods appropriated, illegally
bought or damaged by neglect, was usually accompanied by a fine, giving it the
form of multiple restoration. This might be double, treble, fourfold, fivefold,
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law had already transcended the purely retributive model in favor of a
code that blended compensatory and punitory functions.41 9 Retribu-
tion is a primitive form of punishment because its focus is not specifi-
cally on the individual, but rather on the individual and his kinship
group.4 20 Because the kinship units are at the heart of gemeinschaft
society, retributory punishment involves the family as a unit, not just
the aggrieved plaintiff.421 The flaw of retributory punishment is the
difficulty of finding equivalence between the degree of injury and the
correct level of punishment to restore justice.422
In recent years, the Supreme Court has also subordinated deter-
rence to retribution, a departure from its earlier constitutional juris-
prudence. In his concurring opinion in TXO Products Corp. v. Alliance
Resources Corp., Justice Kennedy contended that the Court's concern
should focus on whether an award reflects jury bias, prejudice, or pas-
sion, and is not tempered with a genuine consideration of deterrence
and retribution.423 In TXO, the Court's concern with deterrence was
demonstrated by the plurality's examination of the relationship be-
tween punitive damages and compensatory damages. 424 The plurality
refused to limit its due process inquiry to the reasonableness of the
relationship between punitive damages and actual damages.4 25
Rather, their inquiry also considered the potential harm of the defen-
dant's conduct "as well as the possible harm to other victims that
might have resulted if similar future behavior were not deterred."426
sixfold, tenfold, twelvefold, even thirtyfold, according to the enormity of the
offence.
Babylonian Law, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 120 (11th ed. 1910); see also THE CODE OFHAMMURABI (L.W. King trans. 1915), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/me-
dieval/hamcode.htm (last modified Feb. 22, 2005) (imposing a thirtyfold fine for stealing
cattle, sheep, an ass, pig, or goat if it belonged to either god or the court, and a tenfoldfine if the property belonged to a freed man of the king; thieves with no financial re-
sources were put to death).
419. See BARRY NICHOLAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO ROMAN LAw 210 (1962) (noting the es-
sential distinction under Roman law between penal actions, which commonly resulted inpayment of more than compensation, and "reipersecutory" actions, which commonly re-
sulted in payment of compensation only). The Twelve Tables acted as "both a statute and
a code"; they consisted of twelve bronze tablets that contained the basis of Roman law. Id.
at 15.
420. Lynn H. Nelson, Lectures in Medieval History, Kansas University, Medieval Law:Minima Non Curat Lex, available at http://www.ku.edu/kansas/medieval/1O8/lectures/
law.html (Jan. 1, 2001).
421. Id.
422. Id.
423. 509 U.S. 443, 467-69 (1993) (KennedyJ., concurring).
424. See id. at 459-62.
425. Id. at 460.
426. Id
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Uncapped punitive damages are therefore required to protect the so-
ciety against the potential harm that might result from concealed anti-
social conduct.
4 27
The Court began to marginalize the function of deterrence in
Cooper, where it stated that "deterrence is not the only purpose served
by punitive damages."4 2' Even before that case the Court had ob-
served that "punitive damages are imposed for purposes of retribution
and deterrence."4 29 The Court's endorsement of retributory punitive
justice in Campbell II is thus a one-dimensional theory at odds with the
multiple functions fulfilled by the remedy under state law.
43 0 The
compulsory ascension of retribution above general punishment and
deterrence in the punitive damages equation is likely to create confu-
sion in the states.431
B. The Manifest Functions of Punitive Damages
At early common law, juries awarded "punitory, vindictive, or ex-
emplary damages; in other words, juries could] blend together the
interests of society and of the aggrieved individual, and give[ ] dam-
ages, not only to recompense the sufferer, but to punish the of-
fender."432 Despite the difference in terminology, punitive damages
serve three basic manifest functions in most jurisdictions: (1) to pun-
427. See Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. W.R. Grace & Co., 877 F.2d 614, 623 (7th Cir. 1989)
("The most straightforward rationale for punitive damages... is that they are necessary to
deter torts or crimes that are concealable.").
428. Cooper Indus., Inc., v. Leatherman Tool Group, Inc., 532 U.S. 424, 439 (2001).
429. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 449 U.S. 1, 19 (1991).
430. Even in Campbell II the Court did state that it recognized both the retributive 
and
deterrent functions of punitives. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 
538 U.S. 408,
416 (2003). On the other functions of punitive damages, see Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness
and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (1982) (arguing that
punitive damages serve the functions of "(1) punishing the defendant; (2) deterring the
defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense;
(4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims
for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiffs attorneys' fees"); Owen,
Overview, supra note 36, at 374 (arguing that modern punitive damages fulfill the roles of
"(1) education, (2) retribution, (3) deterrence, (4) compensation and (5) law enforce-
ment" (footnotes omitted)).
431. See 1 JOHN J. KIRCHER & CHRISTINE M. WISEMAN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: LAW AND PRAC
TICE § 4.13, at 4-15 (Cum. Supp. 2004) ("In by far and away the vast majority of jurisdic-
tions which sanction awards of non-compensatory, punitive damages, the reason advanced
for allowing those damages is that they will affect punishment and deterrence. The two
questions which then must obviously arise are: Punishment of whom? Deterrence 
of
whom?").
432. Pegram v. Stortz, 244 6 S.E. 485, 498 (W. Va. 1888) (quoting SEDGWICK, supra note
46, at 39).
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ish the defendant (punishment); (2) to deter the defendant (specific
deterrence); and (3) to deter others (general deterrence).
1. Punishment Function.-The Court's judicial miniaturism pro-
tects corporate defendants much like the discredited Lochner-erajuris-
prudence, in which the Court struck down scores of corporate
regulations by investing the due process clause with an economic lib-
erties theory. The retributive function of punitive damages4 33 identi-
fied by the Court conflicts with the punishment and deterrence
functions of punitive damages followed by most state courts.43 4 In
most jurisdictions, punitive damages are awarded in the jury's discre-
tion "to punish [the defendant] for his outrageous conduct and todeter him and others like him from similar conduct in the future. 43
Punitive damages in Maryland, for example, "are awarded in an at-
tempt to punish a defendant whose conduct is characterized by evil
motive, intent to injure, or fraud, and to warn others contemplating
similar conduct of the serious risk of monetary liability." '436 The pur-
pose of Texas's exemplary damages "is similar to that for criminal
punishment, and like criminal punishment, punitive damages require
appropriate substantive and procedural safeguards to minimize risk of
unjust punishment. 4 7
States vary significantly in their philosophies of civil punishment
as well as in their standards for imposing punishment. Punitive dam-
ages in the states often reflect social mores of the local jurisdiction. A
state's legitimate interests in punishing unlawful conduct and deter-
ring its repetition varies, depending upon the economic base. A fed-
eral court applying Alaska law, for example, imposed a $5 billion
punitive damages award against Exxon for knowingly permitting a re-
lapsed alcoholic sea captain to direct the operation of a supertanker
carrying fifty-three million gallons of oil through Prince William
Sound's prime fishing area.438
433. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 381, at 1063 (2000) ("The idea of punish-
ment or retribution is that it is just for the defendant to suffer for his misconduct. Theidea of deterrence is quite different. It is that a sufficient sum should be exacted from the
defendant to make repetition of the misconduct unlikely.").
434. See Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 45, at 1318 ("The punishment
and deterrence functions are the most frequently cited rationales for the remedy of puni-
tive damages." (footnote omitted)).
435. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1).
436. Owens-Illinois, Inc. v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 650 (Md. 1992).437. Transp. Ins. Co. v. Moriel, 879 S.W.2d 10, 16-17 (Tex. 1994) (footnote omitted).
438. In re Exxon Valdez, 236 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1046 (D. Alaska 2002); see also In re ExxonValdez, 296 F. Supp. 2d 1071, 1110 (D. Alaska 2004) (applying Campbell II guidelines in
remitting a $5 billion punitive damages award to $4.5 billion).
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Punitive damages vindicate different interests in a state with a
large agricultural sector than in one where software licensing, high
technology or Internet businesses drive the state economy. A jury in
Alabama, for example, awarded punitive damages in a case where a
large agribusiness firm systematically cheated hundreds of chicken
farmers by underweighing their chickens." 9 Arizona, which has a
large health-oriented population, imposes punitive damages by statute
for willful misconduct in health spa contracts.44° California places a
high value on the confidentiality of medical information, and pro-
vides punitive damages for unlawful disclosure by providers.
441 Cali-
fornia, as the center of the U.S. entertainment industry, also imposes
punitive damages for the unauthorized commercial use of a deceased
personality's name, voice, or likeness.442 California uses the sanction
of punitive damages to protect its considerable fine art holdings from
being altered or destroyed,44 3 and finally, the remedy of punitive dam-
ages for rent skimming protects the large numbers of new immigrants
to California.444
2. Specific and General Deterrence. -Punitive damages, like crimi-
nal sentences, are predicated upon a model of deterrence. Deter-
rence in turn is based on the assumption that defendants engage in
misconduct only after rationally weighing benefits and potential
costs.4 45 Calabresi was the first writer to apply the criminal law con-
cepts of specific and general deterrence to tort remedies.
446 Specific
deterrence assesses a price to a particular wrongful act whereas gen-
eral deterrence fulfills the larger function of vindicating the broader
societal interest by making wrongful acts more expensive and less at-
439. Braswell v. Conagra, Inc., 936 F.2d 1169 (11th Cir. 1991).
440. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-1796.C (West 2003).
441. CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.35 (West Supp. 2004).
442. Id. § 3344.1(a) (1).
443. Id § 987(e)(3).
444. Id. § 891(a).
445. See Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981). In Grimshaw,
Ford's decision to expose consumers to the risk of an exploding gas tank was based on an
unethical "cost-benefit analysis" that balanced egregiously undervalued "human lives and
limbs against corporate profit." Id. at 384. Profit maximizers must know that the worst-
case scenario (with punitive damages in place) is more serious than merely paying only
what was owed in the first place (compensatory damages and a criminal sanction), plus
legal expenses. Under California law, the maximum criminal penalty for violating federal
automobile safety standards would have been $1,000 per vehicle (and up to a maximum of
$800,000), an amount dwarfed by Ford's net worth of $7.7 billion and its after-tax income
of $983 million. Id. at 388-89.
446. See generally THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS, supra note 20.
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tractive to potential wrongdoers.447 Calabresi transformed the way we
think about punitive damages as a tort remedy with multiple goals and
subgoals.448 One of these goals in particular, the concept of general
deterrence, may be seen as fulfilling a societal purpose.44 9
There are many obvious parallels between the general deterrence
function of punitive damages and the criminal side of the law. Plea-
bargaining in criminal law resembles the informal process of settle-
ment that occurs when a trial lawyer has uncovered "smoking gun"
documents demonstrating corporate concealment. On the criminal
side of the law, sentencing occurs in a separate proceeding, in which
the court determines punishment according to the circumstances of
the case. Sentencing guidelines under federal criminal law provide
more specific guidance in setting punishment. On the civil side, many
states have enacted the procedural reform of bifurcation that sepa-
rates the compensatory stage from the punitive damages proceed-
ing.45° Bifurcation ensures that the jury does not consider evidence
material to punitive damages but highly prejudicial to the issue of
compensatory damages.45' In each case, the focus is on whether soci-
ety is protected by the punitory sanction.
Punitive damages have traditionally been imposed to deter the
wrongdoer and have historically not depended upon the amount of
actual damage, but rather upon the enormity and the circumstances
447. Id. at 26-27.
448. See id. at 26-31. I am also inspired byJudge Calabresi's keynote address at the AALSTorts Conference, in which he discussed the multiple functions of punitive damages. Cala-
bresi, 21st Century Judging and Tort Law, supra note 417.449. The $10 million punitive damages award affirmed by the Supreme Court in TXOProduction Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443 (1993), is an example. The awardin TXO was predicated upon not only the actual harm suffered by the plaintiff but thepotential harm of the defendant's course of conduct, the degree of bad faith displayed by
the defendant, and whether the conduct was part of a "larger pattern of fraud, trickery anddeceit." Id. at 462. The $10 million punitive award was a message of general deterrence to
the entire oil and gas industry, not to engage in predatory business practices.
450. See supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
451. Bifurcation of punitive damages separates the adjudication of punishment fromthe issue of compensatory damages. Bifurcation is another example of the states serving aslaboratories of experimentation with tort reform. A number of states bifurcate only thedetermination of the amount of punitive damages from the rest of the trial. E.g., CAL. CIV.
CODE § 3295(d); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West 1991) (stating that courts inproducts liability cases must determine punitive damages after the finder of fact has deter-
mined compensatory damages). A few states bifurcate any proceedings on punitive dam-
ages from proceedings on compensatory damages. E.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20, subd.4; Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-1-65(1) (b), (d) (2002). The bifurcation of punitive damages pre-
vents the jury from hearing potentially inflammatory evidence such as the wealth of the
corporate defendant, until punitive liability is established. Some states have compulsorybifurcation, while in other states either party may request bifurcation. For more on statebifurcation procedures, see supra notes 244-245 and accompanying text.
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of the wrong.452 It is optimal that punitive damages are roughly pro-
portional to the enormity of the wrong rather than to actual damages,
which may be slight.4 53 Insurance bad faith cases like the Campbell
case illustrate well the consequences of the misuse of asymmetric in-
formation inherent in the relationship of insurer and insured.
The concepts of specific and general deterrence were also articu-
lated in the asbestos products liability case of Jackson v. Johns-Manville
Sales Corp.4 54 In that case, the Fifth Circuit addressed as a basis for
punitive damages societal disfavor with the asbestos manufacturers'
failure to warn workers of the consequences of unprotected exposure
to asbestos dust.45 5  The court noted that punitive damages are
awarded "both as an expression of society's disfavor of their action
'and as an example so that others may be deterred from the commis-
sion of similar offenses.' ' 456 Quite to the contrary, the Campbell II
Court explicitly criticized the plaintiffs use of evidence of the in-
surer's "national scheme to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping
payouts on claims company wide."4 5 7
The Campbell II Court thus subordinated the role of general de-
terrence in its view that punitive damages may not be used as a plat-
form to punish larger corporate policies. In fact, the Supreme Court
did not distinguish between the general or specific deterrence func-
tions in its Campbell II opinion, despite the fact that these functions
have long been recognized in the common law.458 Meanwhile, the
Campbell IlCourt's second due process guidepost focuses on the math-
452. See, e.g., Donovan v. Consolidated Coal Co., 88 Ill. App. 589, 598 (1899) (noting
that punitive damages are imposed by way of punishment of the wrongdoer and do not
"depend upon . . . the amount of actual pecuniary damage sustained, but depend wholly
upon the motive, purpose and condition of mind and heart of the wrongdoer and the
circumstances and manner of his doing the wrong").
453. For example, punitive damages were assessed against an insurance company that
taught its adjusters to chisel payments on claims because policyholders were unlikely to
discover or strenuously object to such petty losses. Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d
1073 (Ariz. 1987); see also Eckenrode v. Life of Am. Ins. Co., 470 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1972)
(upholding an award against a life insurer for its practice of using "economic coercion" to
"compromise" valid claims); Moore v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 878 (Ct.
App. 1984) (upholding punitive damages against a company engaged in a bad faith insur-
ance scheme); Delos v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc., 155 Cal. Rptr. 843, 857 (Ct. App. 1979)
(affirming an award against insurer for a "nefarious scheme to mislead and defraud
thousands of policyholders").
454. 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986).
455. Id at 403.
456. Id. (quoting Snowden v. Osborne, 269 So. 2d 858, 860 (Miss. 1972)).
457. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003) (quoting
Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.2d 1134, 1143 (Utah 2001)).
458. As the Court noted in Campbell II, "Compensatory damages 'are intended to redress
the concrete loss that the plaintiff has suffered by reason of the defendant's wrongful con-
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ematical ratio between actual or potential harm suffered and punitive
damages. 459 The Court explicitly stated that high-ratio punitive dam-
ages awards are disfavored:
Our jurisprudence and the principles it has now established
demonstrate . . . that, in practice, few awards exceeding a
single-digit ratio between punitive and compensatory dam-
ages, to a significant degree, will satisfy due process .... Sin-
gle-digit multipliers are more likely to comport with due
process, while still achieving the State's goals of deterrence
and retribution, than awards with ratios in range of 500 to 1,
or, in this case, of 145 to 1.460
Although declining to impose a fixed cap that a punitive damages
award cannot exceed, the Court has imposed a de facto cap. The
Court's informal single-digit ratio between punitive damages and com-
pensatory damages will likely have a chilling effect upon the imposi-
tion of high-ratio punitive damages awards in the cases where the
harm to society is significantly greater than the level of compensatory
damages. The Court does acknowledge the possibility of high-ratio
punitive damages when compensatory damages are low, but when
compensatory damages are substantial, "perhaps [punitive damages]
only equal to compensatory damages" may be appropriate.461
3. Augmented Compensation.-The Campbell H Court's reprehensi-
bility analysis is entirely incompatible with jurisdictions that recognize
punitive damages as a form of additional compensation. The punitive
damage remedy has always played an exclusively compensatory role in
Connecticut462 and Michigan.4 6 3 If punishment and deterrence are
not part of these states' punitive damages equations, there is little
question that courts in these states will be at a loss to apply the Camp-
bell II principles. Reviewing courts in Connecticut and Michigan will
duct.'" Id. at 416 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903). "By contrast, punitive
damages serve a broader function; they are aimed at deterrence and retribution." Id.
459. Id. at 424-25.
460. Id. at 425 (citation omitted).
461. Id.
462. In Connecticut, an award of punitive damages is imposed to pay a plaintiffs litiga-
tion expenses. Collens v. New Canaan Water Co., 234 A.2d 825, 831-32 (Conn. 1967) (stat-
ing that punitive damages were purely compensatory and may not exceed plaintiff's
litigation expenses, minus taxable costs); see also Gagne v. Town of Enfield, 734 F.2d 902,
904 (2d Cir. 1984); Bates v. McKeon, 650 F. Supp. 476, 481 (D. Conn. 1986).
463. Peisner v. Detroit Free Press, 364 N.W.2d 600, 608 (Mich. 1984);Jackovich v. Gen.
Adjustment Bureau, Inc. 326 N.W.2d 458, 464 (Mich. Ct. App. 1982) (holding that puni-
tive damages are to compensate the plaintiff for humiliation and indignity suffered as a
result of defendant's tort).
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find it difficult, if not impossible, to apply the Court's reprehensibility
framework, which is entirely incompatible with these states' quasi-
compensatory remedies of punitive damages. Campbell II also poses
problems in jurisdictions where punitive damages serve as "mock com-
pensatory damages" or have compensatory subgoals.464
In augmented-compensation jurisdictions, moreover, retributory
punishment plays no role. Augmented-compensation jurisdictions de-
emphasize punitive damages for punishment and deterrence and in-
stead reserve this remedy for intangible injuries, the expense of litiga-
tion, or as something extra awarded for the inconvenience of
litigation.465 Augmented compensation is frequently justified on the
grounds that the contingency fee system ensures that plaintiffs will be
systematically undercompensated 466 because they must pay substantial
legal fees. Compensation can therefore be thought of as a "residual"
function of punitive damages.467 Even states not formally recognizing
punitive damages will sometimes permit extracompensatory damages
to be awarded as the equivalent of civil punishment.
468
464. Several jurisdictions recognize augmented compensation as a subgoal of punitive
damages. Idaho, for example, permits courts to assess punitive damages for attorney's fees,
but does not necessarily preclude an award of punitive damages that also has a punitive
and deterrent element. See, e.g., Erhardt v. Leonard, 657 P.2d 494, 499 (Idaho Ct. App.
1983) (holding that punitive damages are appropriate to reimburse the plaintiffs attorney
fees and other related expenses where the defendant was found to have acted in a mali-
cious and wanton manner). Compensation may also be considered as a subgoal of puni-
tive damages in Virginia and West Virginia. See, e.g., Sperry Rand v. A-T-O, Inc., 459 F.2d
19, 21 (4th Cir. 1972) (noting that Virginia law does not prohibit the assessment of puni-
tive damages simply because they serve in part to compensate some of the plaintiffs loss);
Perry v. Melton, 299 S.E.2d 8, 12-13 (W. Va. 1982) (holding that punitive damages can be
recovered even if no compensatory damages are awarded and noting that punitives may
provide the plaintiff additional compensation).
465. See Rustad & Koenig, Historical Continuity, supra note 45, at 1321-22.
466. Id, at 1321. Conversely, it is sometimes argued that where punitive damages exceed
litigation costs, the plaintiff receives a windfall. Note, An Economic Analysis of the Plaintiffs
Windfall from Punitive Damage Litigation, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1900, 1905 (1992).
467. David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REv.
1257, 1295-96 (1976) [hereinafter Punitive Damages in Products Liability] (noting that the
compensatory role is "usually residual"); Note, supra note 466, at 1402 (describing this
function as "secondary").
468. Massachusetts, for example, does not recognize punitive damages absent a statute,
but permits compensatory damages to be increased to punish. In Smith v. Holcomb, 99
Mass. 552 (1868), the plaintiff produced evidence that the defendant struck him. The trial
judge instructed the jury that the plaintiff could recover for all the direct injurious results
of the assault, as well as for insult and indignity. Id. at 554. The Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court affirmed, stating:
The insult and indignity inflicted upon a person by giving him a blow with anger,
rudeness or insolence, occasion mental suffering. In many cases they constitute
the principal element of damage. They ought to be regarded as an aggravation of
the tort, on the same ground that insult and indignity, offered by the plaintiff to
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C. Latent Functions of Punitive Damages
The concept of latent function extends the analysis of punitive
damages beyond the question of whether or not the sanction attains
its avowed purpose of punishment and deterrence. Punitive damages
not only perform the manifest function of punishing and deterring
the defendant and others, but also fulfill less acknowledged latent
functions. The Wisconsin Supreme Court described punitive damages
as a critically important legal institution:
[It] is an outgrowth of the English love of liberty regulated
by law. It tends to elevate the jury as a responsible instru-
ment of government, discourages private reprisals, restrains
the strong, influential, and unscrupulous, vindicates the
right of the weak, and encourages recourse to, and confi-
dence in, the courts of law by those wronged or oppressed by
acts or practices cognizable in, or not sufficiently punished,
by the criminal law.4 6 9
As the Sections that follow demonstrate, however, the U.S. Su-
preme Court's constitutionalization of punitive damages has had the
unanticipated consequence of undermining each multiple and latent
function of punitive damages.
1. Encouragement of Private Attorneys GeneraLJ-Judge Jerome
Frank used the term "private attorney general" to refer to "any person,
official or not," who brought a proceeding "even if the sole purpose is
to vindicate the public interest. 4 70 Expanding on this concept, an-
other court noted that "the plaintiff acts as a private attorney general
to punish the culpable wrongdoer, thereby encouraging adherence to
safety standards that benefit [society] generally .... [I] t is not the
plaintiff's individual right, but society's as a whole, that is being de-
fended. 4 71 Courts, however, rarely mention the role of punitive dam-
ages in serving as private enforcement for a public purpose. If
plaintiffs "are entrusted with the role of private attorneys general, [the
the defendant, which provoked the assault, may be given in evidence in mitiga-
tion of the damage.
469. Id. at 554-55.
Luther v. Shaw, 147 N.W. 17, 20 (Wis. 1914).
470. Assoc. Indus. of N.Y. State, Inc. v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694, 704 (2d Cir. 1943).
471. Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983); see also Kink v.
Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965) (noting how punitive damages serve the public
because the private individual acts as a prosecutor to punish harmful conduct).
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punitive damages] must be great enough to encourage the filing and
prosecution of an action.
472
Punitive damages encourage the prosecution of claims by those
who otherwise might not have the incentive to incur the expense of
"scorched earth" litigation against a large corporation. 47 ' By encour-
aging plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general, punitive damages
fulfill their most critical latent function as they vindicate the larger
societal interest by bridging the enforcement gap and increase both
punishment and deterrence.47 4 Punitive damages have consistently
provided important protection for average citizens against entities too
powerful to be constrained by lesser remedies. Punitive damages
meld the two opposed sides of the law, the private and the public.
The term "crimtort" captures the expanding middle ground between
criminal and tort law, which is increasingly the subject of punitive
damages litigation.
4 75
The private attorney general can also serve as a "powerful engine
of public policy"476 because of its responsiveness to social problems.
Private attorneys general use private enforcement to advance the pub-
lic interest in an efficient manner that is responsive to market
forces.477 Meanwhile, public law enforcement resources may not be
472. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Dam-
ages, 51 LA. L. REv. 3, 73 (1990).
473. See Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437, 454 (Wis. 1980).
474. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability, supra note 467, at 1287-88 (arguing that
"the prospect of punitive damages recoveries induces injured plaintiffs to act as 'private
attorneys general' and thereby helps to increase the number of wrongdoers who are prop-
erly 'brought to justice") (footnotes omitted)).
475. Grant Gilmore described "contorts" as cases that lie on the borderline between
contract and tort law. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 98 (Ronald K.L. Collins
ed., 1995). This inspires the term "crimtort," to identify the expanding common ground
between criminal and tort law:
Crimtorts are not a new body of law per se or even a new cause of action. Rather,
crimtorts are an explicit recognition that the criminal law principles of punish-
ment and deterrence have been assimilated into tort remedies. Crimtorts have a
unique capacity simultaneously to fulfill a private function of compensating in-
jured claimants and a public law purpose of controlling socially harmful behavior.
The trend towards the absorption of criminal law elements into torts can be seen
in many recent high profile cases.
Thomas Koenig & Michael Rustad, "Crimtorts" as Corporate Just Deserts, 31 U. MICH. J.L. RE-
FORM 289, 294 (1998).
476. Jeremy A. Rabkin, The Secret Life of the Private Attorney General 61 LAw & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 179, 179 (1998).
477. Some prominent law and economics scholars have endorsed punitive damages for
their ability to encourage people not to use formal enforcement measures. See WILLIAM M.
LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAw 160-61 (1987).
The private attorney general institution can function without a large government bureau-
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flexible enough to prosecute particular wrongs.4 7 8 For example, it was
private attorneys general, not regulators, who uncovered smoking gun
documents of an industry-wide conspiracy to conceal the risks of as-
bestos exposure.479 In that complex litigation, punitive damages
"awards act [ed] almost as a form of criminal penalty administered in a
civil court at the request of a plaintiff who serves somewhat as a private
attorney general. ' '480 The proceeds of the asbestos litigation in turn
provided the funds needed to underwrite the costs of taking on big
tobacco. It was also private attorneys general, rather than public regu-
lators, who uncovered internal documents that exposed tobacco in-
dustry lies about addiction and nicotine manipulation and brought
the industry to the settlement table.48'
Punitive damages are particularly needed "where there are gaps
in the criminal law."'4 82 Private attorneys general provide a backup 483
in situations in which government enforcement agencies fail to pro-
tect the public adequately.4 84 Government regulatory agencies have
played a relatively minor role in uncovering the smoking guns utilized
to obtain punitive damages verdicts in products liability. 485 Nations
without private attorneys general tend to have a huge government bu-
cracy because plaintiffs receive the full amount of punitive damages as an incentive for
bringing cases.
478. See TVT Records v. Island DefJam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 425 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
479. SeeJackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394, 403 (5th Cir. 1986) (hold-
ing that in the asbestos litigation "punitive damages reward individuals who serve as 'pri-
vate attorneys general' in bringing wrongdoers to account").
480. In re Sch. Asbestos Litig., 789 F.2d 996, 1003 (3d Cir. 1986).
481. Henry Weinstein & Myron Levin, Tobacco Companies lood Internet with Documents;
Litigation: 27 Million Pages Are Posted to Deflect Critics, Charges They're Hiding Damaging Infor-
mation, L.A. TiMEs, Feb. 28, 1998, at Al. Tobacco litigation, brought by both private law-
yers and State Attorneys General, is credited with revealing over the last decade many
secret, and damaging, industry documents. Id.
482. Leslie E. John, Note, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the Bor-
derland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REv. 2033, 2051 (1986).
483. One area in which the government relies heavily upon "private attorneys general"
is the enforcement of environmental statutes. Robert F. Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as
Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked
Problems of Outcome-Independent Values, 22 GA. L. REV. 337, 340 (1988). The private attorney
general role is also explicitly recognized in federal antitrust actions, where a private party is
permitted a treble damage remedy. 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2000).
484. See, e.g., Blomquist, supra note 483, at 366 (describing the advent of the citizen-suit
provision of the Clean Air Act as a means to ensure enforcement, when Republican admin-
istrations of the 1970s would be unlikely to do so).
485. See, e.g., Thiry v. Armstrong World Indus., 661 P.2d 515, 518 (Okla. 1983) (noting
how individual, private plaintiffs, in seeking punitive damages for products liability torts,
ultimately benefit society by encouraging adherence to safety standards); see also Kink v.
Combs, 135 N.W.2d 789, 798 (Wis. 1965) (recognizing that without the promise of punitive
damages some unlawful conduct will go unpunished).
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reaucracy to serve as advocates for victim's rights.486 Punitive damages
deter even the most powerful corporations because the level of the
award is often based upon a company's net worth or earnings. In the
vast majority of states, the wealth of the defendant is admissible to
determine the amount of punitive damages necessary to deter the
wrongdoer.487 The next Subsection examines the chilling effect of
Campbell II on the role of private attorneys general in bad faith insur-
ance cases and other corporate wrongdoing cases based upon "pat-
tern and practice" evidence.
a. Extraterritorial Limitations on the Private Attorney General.-
The Campbell II Court has not only articulated substantive and proce-
dural standards for limiting punitive damage awards, but even rules of
evidence. This conflicts with the practice where "the States, and not
[the] Court, retain 'the traditional authority' to determine what par-
ticular evidence... is relevant. '488 The private attorney general func-
tion of punitive damages has been undermined by the U.S. Supreme
486. Ironically then, a robust punitive damages regime is consistent with the self-interest
of the business community. In the long run, the American emphasis on safety in products
liability will produce top quality products needed to compete in the international market-
place. It is a delusion that limiting punitive damages will improve U.S. competitiveness.
Punitive damages keep the ethical corporation from being at a competitive disadvantage
with its unethical domestic and foreign competitors. There are a large number of exam-
ples of foreign companies who were assessed punitive damages for the grossly inadequate
testing and design of products. See, e.g., Dorsey v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 655 F.2d 650
(5th Cir. 1981) (applying Florida law and upholding punitive damages against Honda for
its poor design of the passenger compartment of a subcompact car). A good example is
the case of the Japanese firm of FujiJukogyo Kabushiki Gaisha, which was assessed punitive
damages for the defective design of the Subaru Brat. The Brat had been designed so that
the seats were located in the bed, qualifying it as a passenger vehicle subject to only a 3%
tariff rather than the 25% import duty applied to trucks. See Cunningham v. Subaru of
Am., 684 F. Supp. 1567 (D. Kan. 1988); see also Michael L. Rustad & Thomas Koenig, Puni-
tive Damages-Plaintiffs View, in 2 PRODUCTS LIABILrry PRACTICE GUIDE § 18.07[1], at 18-69
(John F. Vargo ed., 2003) (citing and discussing the Subaru Brat case). The "competitive
disadvantage" argument is misleading because the legal climate of our major trading part-
ners is converging with that of the United States. The European Community's adoption of
the Products Liability Directive is an example of this convergence. See William Dawkins,
Brussels Draws Up Basic Safety Rules for Consumer Goods, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 1987, at 13
(describing the development of new minimum safety standards for all consumer products
by the European Commission). While it is true that only the Anglo-American legal system
permits the awarding of punitive damages, there are functional equivalents such as aug-
mented civil fines in some countries. The European Union recently imposed a roughly
$600 million fine against Microsoft for antitrust violations in its marketing of the Windows
operating system in Europe. Jonathan Krim, Microsoft Lobbies Hard to Reverse EU Antitrust
Penalties, GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, Mar. 31, 2004.
487. Theodore Emens Cowen, Comment, Zen and the Art of Exemplary Damages Assessment,
72 Ky. L.J. 897, 910 (1984); see supra notes 34, 244 and accompanying text (citing
examples).
488. Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
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Court's new rules for the use of "dissimilar and out-of-state conduct
evidence" to "expose, and punish, the perceived deficiencies" of na-
tional corporations such as insurers.48 9 The Court in Campbell H ob-
served that "[1]awful out-of-state conduct may be probative when it
demonstrates the deliberateness and culpability of the defendant's ac-
tion in the State where it is tortious, but that conduct must have a
nexus to the specific harm suffered by the plaintiff."49 0 In a bad faith
insurance case, however, the plaintiff will not typically be in a position
to prove that the insurer was a recidivist unless out-of-state prior mis-
conduct is admissible.
Corporate policies are set at the national level, and it would be
unlikely that a firm targets consumers in a specific state for unfair or
deceptive settlement practices.491 The amicus brief of the state attor-
neys general in Campbell /contended that the private attorney general
function of punitive damages would be crippled if a factfinder was
prevented from considering anything other than what the defendant
did to the specific plaintiffs in the particular case before the court. 4 9 2
The states have traditionally been free to use punitive damages to en-
courage plaintiffs to serve as private attorneys general and thereby to
perform important functions in promoting public health, safety, and
welfare. 49 3 If punitive damages are limited, however, the states will be
unable to encourage this type of civil enforcement. Moreover, the
Court's limitation on the admissibility of other bad acts conflicts with
other traditional aspects of state law, such as the practice of informing
juries of other punitive damages awarded for the same course of
conduct.4 9 4
In some bad faith insurance cases, the amount of money chiseled
from any one policyholder may be too small to warrant the time and
energy to sue a Fortune 500 firm. In such situations, where a corpo-
489. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408, 420 (2003).
490. Id. at 422.
491. The Utah trial court permitted the plaintiff in the Campbell case to introduce evi-
dence of "a national scheme [by State Farm] to meet corporate fiscal goals by capping
payouts on claims company wide." Campbell v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 65 P.3d
1134, 1143 (Utah 2001). The Supreme Court marginalized the use of extraterritorial bad
acts evidence. See Campbell II, 538 U.S. at 422 (noting that each state makes its own rules
about what type of conduct is permitted within its borders and determines independently
the punishment for violating those rules).
492. Brief of Amici Curiae of the Attorneys General of the States of Minnesota, Dela-
ware, Florida, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nevada, Oklahoma,
Oregon, and Rhode Island at 7-8, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell, 538 U.S. 408
(2003) (No. 01-1289).
493. Id. at 3-4, 7-8.
494. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908 cmt. e.
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rate defendant has acted and continues to act in violation of the rights
of a large group of people solely for the calculated purpose of making
more money, punitive damages awards by state courts may be the only
effective remedy. Private attorneys general have traditionally obtained
punitive damages in cases where insurance companies misappropriate
small amounts from their policyholders.495 After Campbell II, though,
counsel now must be careful about the use of "sending a message"
arguments because of the Court's restrictions upon the probative
value of "dissimilar and out-of-state conduct." '496 The Court's restric-
tions on the use of extraterritorial bad acts will thus have a chilling
impact on the typical bad faith insurance case in which settlement
policies are set at the national headquarters.49 7 In future cases, the
evidence must be framed to make it appear that a national corpora-
tion has set policies directed at individual policyholders,49 for "[d] ue
process does not permit courts, in the calculation of punitive dam-
ages, to adjudicate the merits of other parties' hypothetical claims
against a defendant under the guise of the reprehensibility
analysis. ""
In the end, the Campbell II Court did leave some limited use for
evidence of extraterritorial conduct. This evidence may be used to
show recidivism. If other-bad-act evidence is used to demonstrate that
the insurer is a recidivist, however, there must be a showing that the
other acts were substantially similar to the harm suffered by the plain-
tiff.5 °° Therefore, in evaluating the reprehensibility of a defendant's
conduct, a court may not consider extraterritorial conduct that has no
nexus to the harm suffered by the plaintiffs. °1
495. Punitive damages have often been assessed against insurance companies that have
shortchanged policyholders-conduct which is dishonest, malicious, and outrageous. See,
e.g., Hawkins v. Allstate Ins. Co., 733 P.2d 1073, 1078 (Ariz. 1987) (upholding punitive
damages against a company that taught adjusters to cheat by "chiseling" small amounts on
claims because policyholders would probably not object to these small deductions); Moore
v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 197 Cal. Rptr. 878, 895 (Ct. App. 1984) (upholding punitive
damages where disability insurance benefits were denied by use of misleading and decep-
tive settlement practices that were "firmly grounded in an established company policy" and
"that had the potential of defrauding countless policyholders other than plaintiff").
496. Campbell H1, 538 U.S. at 420.
497. Id. at 421 (noting that "[a] State cannot punish a defendant for conduct that may
have been lawful where it occurred" and indicating the lack of public policy reasons for
doing so).
498. Id. at 422-23.
499. Id. at 423.
500. Id.
501. Id. at 422.
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b. Corporate Pattern and Practice Evidence.-Another troubling
aspect of Campbell II is that the Court's extraterritorial rules are at
odds with rules about the admissibility of other acts found in the Fed-
eral Rules of Evidence. Under the Federal Rules of Evidence, prior
bad acts are not admissible unless they are relevant to a material,
noncharacter issue. In products liability actions, for example, prior
consumer complaints regarding a particular product can be offered to
prove a manufacturer's knowledge of a defect in that product, and
thus support plaintiffs' punitive damages claims, as they demonstrate
reprehensible conduct.5 °3 Limitations on the use of extraterritorial
bad acts will therefore encumber private attorneys general in products
liability cases.5" 4 This is particularly damaging in these cases because
in a typical products liability case marketing is directed to a wide array
of consumers throughout the country over a lengthy period.5" 5
At common law, plaintiffs had the right to introduce any evi-
dence that either directly or indirectly demonstrated that a company
was acting in reckless disregard of the rights of consumers in most
jurisdictions.0 6 The Court's restrictions on extraterritorial evidence
also conflict with the well-established "substantial similarity test" that
evolved under the common law. The states already have rules that
screen evidence relevant to corporate patterns and practice. In Gen-
eral Motors Corp. v. Moseley,5" 7 the Georgia Court of Appeals reversed a
judgment that included $101 million in punitive damages in the fa-
mous GMC pickup case, where a vehicle caught fire due to the place-
ment of the gas tank and led to the plaintiffs death.5"' The Moseley
court found it improper for the trial court to introduce evidence of
prior fuel-fed fires involving GMC pickups without first making a
502. Huddleston v. United States, 485 U.S. 681, 687-88 (1988) (citing and interpreting
FED. R. EVID. 404(b)).
503. See Elaine K. Zipp, Annotation, Admissibility of Evidence of Other Crimes, Wrongs, or Acts
Under Rule 404(b) of Federal Rules of Evidence, in Civil Cases, 64 A.L.R. FED. 648, 666 (1983)
(citing cases).
504. Assuming, of course, that this evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b) for
noncharacter purposes, "such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED. R. EVIO. 404(b).
505. See, e.g., Palmer v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., 684 P.2d 187, 220 (Colo. 1984) ("Robins'
marketing program occurred over a long period of time, was directed to a vast array of
unwary consumers, and was accompanied by false claims of safety and a conscious disre-
gard of life threatening hazards known by it to be associated with its product.").
506. Id. at 204 (noting that evidence of other acts by the defendant is admissible to show
the defendant's disposition, intention, or motive for committing the alleged injuries to the
plaintiff).
507. 447 S.E.2d 302 (Ga. Ct. App. 1994).
508. Id. at 305.
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showing of substantial similarity to the incident in question.5°' The
court held that in products liability actions, evidence of other inci-
dents involving the product is admissible and relevant to the issues of
notice of a defect and punitive damages, so long as there is a showing
of substantial similarity.5
10
In Worsham v. A.H. Robins Co., 5 11 the Eleventh Circuit ruled that
the trial court properly admitted evidence of prior consumer injuries
caused by the Dalkon Shield, an intrauterine contraceptive device
(IUD) manufactured by the defendant.5 12 The manufacturer had re-
ceived complaints from users who developed serious infections caused
by their product.513 The court held that evidence of these other com-
plaints was admissible because they involved similar infections to that
suffered by the plaintiff and could show that the manufacturer was
aware of the product's defect.
5 14
Similarly, in Hilliard v. A.H. Robins Co.,515 the plaintiff was permit-
ted to introduce evidence that the IUD that she used had caused seri-
ous pelvic inflammatory disease and spontaneous abortions in other
users.516 The Hilliard court concluded that such evidence was rele-
vant, as it had "a tendency ... to prove that [A.H. Robins] was aware
of the probable dangerous consequences" of its conduct and took no
remedial steps to protect the public. 51 7 The corporate concealment
that occurred in the Dalkon Shield IUD cases was at the national
headquarters level, and was not directed at any one plaintiff: "The
A.H. Robins Company marketed [the] Dalkon Shield IUD knowing it
was dangerous to women and presumably hoping that profits would
exceed liability."51 These landmark products liability cases might
509. Id. at 307.
510. Id.
511. 734 F.2d 676 (11th Cir. 1984).
512. Id. at 689.
513. Id. at 686.
514. Id. at 686-87.
515. 196 Cal. Rptr. 117 (Ct. App. 1983).
516. Id. at 132-33.
517. Id. at 133.
518. DOBBS, supra note 433, § 381, at 1065. In the modern products liability case, adver-
tisements are not directed at any one plaintiff, but to market segments. In Leichtamer v.
American Motors Corp., 424 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 1981), AMC dared America's youth in the
following television advertisement: "[Y]ou guys aren't yellow, are you? Is it a steep hill?
Yeah, little lady, you could say it is a steep hill. Let's try it. The King of the Hill, is about to
discover the new Jeep CJ-7." Id. at 579. It turned out that AMC cared more about the
Jeep's rugged good looks than safety. Id. at 580. It failed to test either the roll-bar design
or ways to prevent 'pitch over" when the vehicle was driven the way the television ad de-
picted. Id. The national advertisement was the smoking gun that led to a $1.1 million
punitive damages award. Id. at 579-80.
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never have been brought if evidence of national corporate policies
were not deemed to be admissible evidence.
Policies set at corporate headquarters were also an important fac-
tor underlying punitive damages in the toxic shock syndrome (TSS)
cases of the 1980s. In Kehm v. Proctor & Gamble Manufacturing Co.,5 9
the representatives of the estate of a woman who died from TSS filed a
punitive damages claim against the manufacturer of the Rely tam-
pon.52" The key pieces of evidence leading to punitive damages were
seven documents and the testimony of one witness all relating to prior
complaints Proctor & Gamble had received.52' The Eighth Circuit
permitted out-of-state complaint letters as well as an internal memo-
randum by corporate counsel summarizing various prior com-
plaints.522 The Kehm court reasoned that these prior complaints were
material evidence:
In this case, consumer complaints need not match the exact
scientific description of TSS in order to show substantial sim-
ilarity between other consumers' illnesses and Mrs. Kehm's
illness. Proctor & Gamble had ample opportunity, of which
it availed itself, to rebut the force of the other complaints by
pointing out dissimilarities between the complainers' symp-
toms and the symptoms of TSS. It was up to the jury to de-
cide what weight to give the complaints from other
consumers.
52 3
Despite these state standards on evidence, the federal courts after
Campbell Hare already placing more restrictions on the use of any out-
of-state bad acts. The Ninth Circuit recently reversed a punitive dam-
ages award against Ford Motor Company because the introduction by
the plaintiffs of "extensive evidence of extraterritorial conduct" and
argument by the plaintiffs' counsel urging the jury to punish the de-
fendant for nationwide conduct constituted a violation of Ford's due
process rights. 24 The Ninth Circuit interpreted the U.S. Supreme
Court's extraterritorial limitations expansively; it ruled that the plain-
tiff could not introduce any evidence of the out-of-state sales of Ford
pick-up trucks, even if the trucks qualified as defective under the
products liability laws of every other relevant jurisdiction.5 25 The
519. 724 F.2d 613 (8th Cir. 1983) (applying federal and Iowa law).
520. Id. at 616.
521. Id. at 625.
522. Id.
523. Id. at 625-26.
524. White v. Ford Motor Co., 312 F.3d 998, 1016 n.69, 1020 (9th Cir. 2002).
525. Id. at 1014, 1018.
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court stated that it was improper for the plaintiffs counsel to go "the
extra and substantial step" in urging punishment and deterrence of
Ford's conduct in other states.52 6
2. Reparative Rights for Victims.-The subgoals of accident law are
to reduce the number and severity of accidents, the social costs result-
ing from accidents (risk spreading), and reductions in the costs of
administering the system of accident law.5 27 Punitive damages also
serve a latent function of restorative justice, or upholding victims'
rights.5 28 As Thomas Lambert has noted, punitive damages "serve as a
vehicle to vent or express the community's sense of outrage at intoler-
able and reprehensible social misconduct." 529 Numerous cases ad-
dress the latent function of punitive damages as a mechanism for
expressing "the community's sense of moral outrage at reprehensible
business practices. "550
In the field of products liability, this remedy has expressed the
moral indignation of the community, for example, in asbestos litiga-
tion.5 '1 The imposition of punitive damages vindicates victims' rights
by essentially forcing manufacturers to fortify product warnings, rede-
sign products to eliminate excessive preventable dangers, or scrap
dangerously defective products in the research labs of America. To
the extent that the remedy causes corporate executives to think twice
before threatening the public safety, it performs its historic function
as an effective social control device. 3 2 Thus, there is overlap between
the reparative justice function and the "prophylactic purpose" of puni-
tive damages in tort law.533
3. Socially Compensatory Damages.-Tort law's capacity to effi-
ciently punish and deter conduct through socially compensatory dam-
526. Id. at 1014.
527. See THE COSTS OF AccIDENTS, supra note 20, at 24-33.
528. See generally Calabresi, 21st CenturyJudging and Tort Law, supra note 417 (discuss-
ing reparative or victims' rights function of punitive damages).
529. THOMAS F. LAMBERT, JR., THE CASE FOR PUNITIVE DAMAcEs: A NEW AUDIT 9 (ATLA
Monograph Series, ArnettJ. Holloway ed., 1988).
530. Id. at 10-11 (citing supporting case law).
531. Id. at 9-11 (citing asbestos litigation as an example of the community expressing
moral outrage and a way to vindicate victims' rights).
532. Id. There is some evidence that punitive damages in products liability resulted in
unsafe products being redesigned, modified, or withdrawn from the marketplace. Michael
Rustad, In Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical
Data, 78 IowA L. REv. 1, 79-82 (1992) (listing results of a study that found various manufac-
turers had removed or modified unsafe products or fortified warnings in punitive damages
litigation).
533. Thomas F. Lambert, Jr., Suing for Safety, TRL, November 1983, at 48.
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ages is central to Calabresi's theory of punitive damages.534 In fact,
the economic analysis of punitive damages was rooted in The Costs of
Accidents.5 35 Judge Calabresi argues that in many cases, "compensa-
tory damages are ... an inaccurate measure of the true harm caused
by an activity." '53 6 Thus, the purpose of punitive damages is primarily
deterrence, but also compensation to society for uncompensated ex-
ternal costs. 5 37 Punitive damages are particularly well suited to serving
as a means of social control in cases involving the pattern and practice
of fraud, where the probability of detection is low. 53  Punitive dam-
ages, according to Judge Calabresi, may be viewed as "socially compen-
satory damages," because they are "designed to make society whole" as
opposed to compensatory damages, which are "assessed to make an
individual victim whole." 5 39 Actors are continually engaging in cost-
benefit analyses to determine whether a given activity is worth the
price. Punitive damages serve as a mechanism for ensuring that the
wrongdoer "bears all the costs of its actions, and is thus appropriately
deterred from causing harm, in those categories of cases in which
compensatory damages alone result in systematic underassessment of
costs, and hence in systematic underdeterrence. ''54" The social cost of
underdeterrence is that "actor[s] will have an incentive to undertake
activities whose social costs exceed their social benefits."
5 41
Professor Catherine Sharkey further elaborates on Calabresi's
work with her innovative concept of "compensatory societal dam-
534. See generally Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 242 (2d Cir. 2000) (Cala-
bresi, J., concurring).
535. The late Gary Schwartz notes that the entire field of the economics of tort law
gained prominence after The Costs of Accidents was published in 1970. Gary T. Schwartz,
Reality in the Economic Analysis of Tort Law: Does Tort Law Really Deter?, 42 UCLA L. REV. 377,
377 (1994).
536. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 244 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
537. See In re Simon II Litig., No. OO-CV-5332, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 25632, at *7-8
(E.D.N.Y. Oct. 22, 2002) (noting each of these aims of punitive damages).
538. See RicHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAw 217-18 (6th ed. 2003); see also
Lutfy v. R.D. Roper & Sons Motor Co., 115 P.2d 161, 165 (Ariz. 1941) (holding that puni-
tive damages can only be sustained upon a showing of recklessness or malice in a fraud
case originating in a vehicle sale); Jones v. W. Side Buick Auto Co., 93 S.W.2d 1083 (Mo.
1936) (applying punitive damages in a case involving a fraudulent used vehicle sale);
Huffman v. Moore, 115 S.E. 634 (S.C. 1923) (affirming punitive damages awarded in a case
involving a fraudulent vehicle sale).
539. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
540. Id. at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring); see also Louis KALOW & STEVEN SHAVELL,
FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE 219-92, 319-31 (2002) (arguing that proportional sanctions on
the criminal side of the law, based solely on the factor of the gravity of the offense, will
result in underdeterrence and will increase social costs).
541. Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 243 (Calabresi, J., concurring).
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ages."542 Professor Sharkey notes that the concept of socially compen-
satory damages addresses "diffuse harms" against society in general.543
She argues that the remedy of punitive damages should be extended
to perform a societal compensation goal: it should redress harms
caused by defendants that injure persons beyond the named plaintiff
in an individual case.54 4 She categorizes punitive damages into spe-
cific harms to identifiable individuals and societal damages whose em-
blem is diffuse harms affecting larger groups or the society.5 45 Her
theory of societal compensation addresses the problem of extraterrito-
rial, multiple punishment through the use of punitive damages in the
context of class actions. 5 46
As punitive damages expanded to control the misdeeds of corpo-
rate America, there were new dimensions such as the multijurisdic-
tional reach of their wrongdoing. The focus of this Part has been the
extent to which the Supreme Court's punitive damages jurisprudence
is interfering with multiple social functions of this valuable remedy.
The Court's focus has been on the role of punitive damages in one-
on-one injuries. However, it is an empirical reality that punitive dam-
ages are increasingly based upon a reckless indifference to the public
safety rather than the "intentional malicious act of an individual
offender. 5
47
The Court's individuation of punitive justice has undermined the
latent functions of punitive damages-including the punishment of
conduct endangering the society as a whole.548 In the past quarter-
century, punitive damages have risen in the field of products liability
to punish and deter objectionable corporate policies where public
regulators have failed to protect the public.549 Punitive damages in
the twenty-first century have expanded even further to accommodate
new kinds of cases against websites, software companies, and the stake-
542. Catherine M. Sharkey, Punitive Damages as Societal Damages, 113 YALE L.J. 347, 352
(2003); see also Ciraolo, 216 F.3d at 245 (Calabresi, J., concurring) (using this concept to
describe the punitive damages goal of imposing costs of the accident on the tortfeasor).
543. Sharkey, supra note 542, at 391-92.
544. Id at 389-92.
545. Id. at 392.
546. Id. at 350-52 (acknowledging the class action as the multistate "paradigm" punitive
damages now claim).
547. TVT Records v. Island DefJam Music Group, 279 F. Supp. 2d 413, 421 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
548. See Sharkey, supra note 542, at 391-92 (noting that one goal of punitive damages
should be to compensate harms to society in general).
549. See, e.g., Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348, 382-83 (Ct. App. 1981)
(noting how punitive damages serve as the most effective remedy in protecting consumers
when government safety regulations have failed to do so).
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holders in the information society.5 The use of punitive damages to
protect society is not a recent innovation of the common law, it is the
common law.
CONCLUSION
The late Justice Byron White once commented that
it is normally "within the power of the State to regulate pro-
cedures under which its laws are carried out".., and its deci-
sion in this regard is not subject to proscription under the
Due Process Clause "unless it offends some principle of jus-
tice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental."
55 1
The history of punitive damages confirms the wisdom of the federalist
model of permitting the states to have relative autonomy when it
comes to the common law. By the early part of the twentieth century,
the remedy of punitive damages evolved to punish corporate defend-
ants in commercial transactions; over the course of the century it con-
tinued to evolve to punish and deter sharp practices such as turning
back the odometer or misrepresenting the quality of automobiles.
The hubris of the philosopher-king is a piece of boundless and
inexcusable intellectual arrogance, as if men were gods, able to regu-
late everything. Like the Lochner period, the Court is investing the
Due Process Clause with new meaning that benefits corporate
America. The Court's federalization of punitive damages permits cor-
porations to argue that punitive damages deprive them of constitu-
tional due process. This pro-corporate interpretation of due process
unduly interferes with goals and subgoals of punitive damages devel-
oped in the states to deter corporate misconduct. The Court's puni-
tive damages jurisprudence is taking a wrecking ball to elaborate state
common-law developments of punitive damages procedure. The
Court's federalization of punitive damages threatens the well-estab-
lished functions of punitive damages developed over two centuries of
Anglo-American jurisprudence.
550. For a discussion of modern issues in tort law and those likely to remain in the near
future, see Chapter 6 of THOMAS H. KOENIG & MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORT
LAw 206-35 (2001).
551. Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 201-02 (1977). Chief Justice Burger quoted
this language and applied it in the context of punitive damages in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Lavoie, 475 U.S. 813, 821 (1986).
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